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Non-technical summary 
Many modern macroeconomic models either adopt a representative agent setup or introduce 
heterogeneity among individuals that leads only to trade in assets, while excluding the possi-
bility that agents gain from trading with each other in goods markets. This paper adds the lat-
ter aspect into the standard framework by assuming that not all agents are perfect substitutes 
in the production of goods from different sectors. In other words, not all agents are equally 
valuable at producing all goods in the short run. Since agents are specialized in the goods they 
can produce in the short run, this creates a situation where there are explicit gains from trade 
between individuals. 
The baseline model of the paper is a two-sector model, where consumption and investment 
goods are produced. The main interest lies in knowing when changes in the information set 
that agents perceive as being relevant for predicting the future may cause booms and busts. 
An important result of the paper is that when labor in both sectors is perfectly homogeneous, 
the Walrasian equilibrium of the economy cannot exhibit positive aggregate co-movement, 
i.e., aggregate consumption, aggregate investment and employment cannot all strictly increase 
after a positive change in the exogenous component in the agents’ information set. The model 
with homogeneous labor thus fails to generate one of the well-established features of business 
cycles. It is shown in the paper, however, that the Walrasian equilibrium of the economy can 
exhibit positive co-movement, if preferences are identical but labor markets are specialized, 
i.e., there are explicit gains from trade. In such a setting, perception driven positive aggregate 
co-movement arises if the market for capital is well-behaved, i.e., aggregate capital supply is 
upward sloping and aggregate capital demand is downward sloping. 
Another focus of the paper is on positive policy analysis. First, the conditions are examined, 
under which fiscal multipliers can be observed. By looking at fiscal policies which are com-
posed only of current government expenditures paid by current taxes and consist of only the 
purchase of investment goods by the government, it is shown that an increase in public spend-
ing tends to crowd out private expenditures when there are no explicit gains from trade. Al-
lowing explicit gains from trade in the model leads, on the other hand, to the opposite result: 
an increase in government purchases of capital goods leads to an increase in private purchases 
of consumption goods and create positive co-movement, while leaving private purchases of 
capital goods relatively untouched. Second, explicit gains from trade is introduced into a 
standard sticky price model in order to check how the conventional wisdom regarding the 
determination of inflation and the role of monetary policy in responding to demand shocks is 
altered. Thus, a simple mechanism is provided where boom-bust cycles are simultaneously 
consistent with stable inflation, as has been observed in the last decades in many economies. 
Finally, it is examined whether the main assumption of the paper, explicit gains from trade 
due to the fact that workers are not perfectly mobile across all sectors of the economy in the 
short run, is supported by the data. Various panel estimations based on PSID data support the 
assumption. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Konjunkturzyklen bilden Veränderungen im Handelsvolumen zwischen Individuen über die 
Zeit ab. In diesem Papier zeigen wir, dass das explizite Einbeziehen von intratemporalen Ge-
winnen aus dem Handel zwischen Individuen in ein makroökonomisches Model zum einen 
neue Einblicke in mögliche Mechanismen, welche konjunkturelle Schwankungen beeinflus-
sen, eröffnen können. Zum anderen können sie dadurch zentrale wirtschaftspolitische Folge-
rungen verändern. Zunächst zeigen wir, wie ein „gains from trade“-Ansatz einfach erklären 
kann, warum Veränderungen in den Erwartungen (einschließlich „Nachrichten“ über die Zu-
kunft und Risikoschocks) Auf- und Abschwünge auslösen können. Als nächstes wenden wir 
uns der Fiskalpolitik zu und erörtern, unter welchen Bedingungen Fiskalmultiplikatoren beo-
bachtet werden können. Während ein Großteil unserer Analyse in einem Umfeld mit flexiblen 
Preisen erfolgt, präsentieren wir auch Implikationen unseres Modells mit Preisstarrheit. Die-
ses erlaubt, Auf- und Abschwünge bei stabiler Inflation zu verstehen. Die Quelle der explizi-
ten Handelsgewinne in unserem Modellrahmen leitet sich von der einfachen Annahme ab, 
dass in der kurzen Frist Arbeiter nicht über alle Wirtschaftssektoren vollständig mobil sind. 
Wir präsentieren anhand Daten des PSID Fakten, die diese Modellannahme unterstützen, vor. 
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Abstract
Business cycles reflect changes over time in the amount of trade between individuals.
In this paper we show that incorporating explicitly intra-temporal gains from trade be-
tween individuals into a macroeconomic model can provide new insight into the potential
mechanisms driving economic fluctuations as well as modify key policy implications. We
first show how a “gains from trade” approach can easily explain why changes in percep-
tions about the future (including “news” about the future and risk shocks) can cause
booms and bust. We then turn to fiscal policy, and discuss under what conditions fiscal
multipliers can be observed. While much of our analysis is conducted in a flexible price
environment, we also present implications of our model for a sticky price environments,
as it allows to understand stable-inflation boom-bust cycles. The source of the explicit
gains from trade in our setup derives from simply assuming that in the short run workers
are not perfect mobile across all sectors of the economy. We provide evidence from the
PSID in support of this modeling assumption.
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1 Introduction
Changes in measured macroeconomic activity are mainly driven by changes in the volume of
trade between individuals. There are two types of causes for such changes. On the one hand,
it may be that agents’ capacity to exploit existing gains from trade changes over time due to
changes in the importance of frictions or policy interventions. On the other hand, it may be
that the actual scope in gains from trade between individuals changes. It would therefore seem
natural that macro-economic models have at their core agents which gain from trading with
each other in goods markets. However, many modern macro-models do not have such a feature
as they either adopt a representative agent setup or introduce heterogeneity among individuals
that leads only to trades in assets, not intra-temporal trade in goods. The aim of this paper
is to illustrate how an explicit treatment of intra-temporal gains from trade in a macro setting
provides new insights regarding the mechanisms behind fluctuations and the effects of policy.
The main assumption we introduce in the model to generate trade among individuals is the
notion that not all agents are perfect substitutes in the production of goods from different
sectors.
Using a very simple framework which emphasizes gains from trade between individuals in
investment good sectors versus those in consumption good sectors, we begin by showing how
and under what condition changes in the perceived future returns on capital goods can lead
to a simultaneous expansion of both the consumption good and investment good sectors. In
our framework we do not need to take a stance on whether the perceived changes in future
returns to capital are driven by objective news about future fundamentals (in the spirit of the
“News shock” literature) or whether the perception changes are driven simply by error or a
fad. While there are alternative setups that can also explain the type of expectation driven
fluctuations we focus upon, we will show that the mechanism emphasized here is very intuitive
and has solid empirical foundation. In particular, the mechanism that drives an expansion in
our setup resembles a textbook type multiplier argument whereby the consumption by one agent
of another agent’s goods leads to subsequent demand effects that expand overall production.
For example, if it is perceived that office buildings will be in high demand in the future, this
creates gains from trade between those capable of producing office buildings and the rest of
the agents in the economy. Agents in the rest of the economy will want to buy-either directly
or indirectly-office buildings, and the builders of offices will accept to build more in exchange
for goods produced by others. We show that such a process naturally leads to a generalized
expansion when perceptions are optimistic, and if the perceptions are reversed, this should lead
to a bust. We also show how this multiplier logic does not rely on sticky prices or departures
from the permanent income hypothesis, but instead relies simply on sectoral labor markets
that are not fully integrated in the short run. In our framework, the set of mutually desirable
trades between individuals change solely due to changes in perceptions about the future value
of certain goods. This contrasts with the RBC literature and many of its spin-offs, in which
surprise improvements in technology directly change the gains from trade.1
In addition to examining the possibility of perception (or expectation) driven business cycles,
we also show how our framework gives insight into the effects of government spending. To this
end we use our framework to examine the effects of a temporary balanced budget increase
1 In the RBC literature the notion of variation in the gains from trade between individuals is often not made
explicit due to the representative agent setup, but the setup can easily be reinterpreted to capture this notion.
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in government spending. If labor markets are fully integrated, then it can be shown quite
generally that temporary changes in government spending cannot lead to an increase in private
consumption nor a multiplier greater than one in an equilibrium setting. However, if workers
are not perfectly mobile across sectors, then depending on the nature of the tax-spending
policy, we show that it can give rise to an increase in private consumption and possibly a
multiplier greater than one. The main issue regarding whether government spending has a
multiplier smaller or greater than one depends in our framework on whether the fiscal package
increases substantially or not gains from trade between the individuals in the different sectors.2
A salient feature of our analysis is to show how labor market segmentation can simultaneously
help explain both perception driven business cycles and the occasional expansionary effect of
government expenditures.
While most of our analysis focuses on environments where prices are fully flexible, we also
discuss implications of our gains from trade framework for monetary policy in a sticky price
environment. To examine this issue we extend a quite standard new Keynesian macro-model
to an environment with two sectors where agents are not mobile between sectors. In this
environment we can derive the level of output that is consistent with stable prices. This level is
often referred to as the natural rate. In basic New Keynesian models, changes in the natural rate
are driven by either changes in productivity, changes in preferences or changes in labor market
frictions. In contrast, in our set up changes in the natural rate can be driven simply by changes
in perception about the future.3 Accordingly, in our framework a wave of optimism (defined
as perception of high future return to capital) which creates more demand will simultaneously
increase the natural rate. What looks like a demand shock –here a wave of demand for capital
goods driven by the perception of high future returns – will not directly put upward pressure
on prices, as in our model the natural rate increases in response to such a shock as it affects
the gains from trade. Such a framework therefore easily explains why optimism-led expansions
are not necessarily inflationary, and why pessimism driven busts may put very little downward
pressure on inflation even when employment is very low.
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. In section 2 we present
our basic framework and derive the competitive equilibrium of the economy. In section 3, we
show how and when changes in perceptions about the future can cause business cycle type
fluctuations if agents are not perfectly mobile across sectors. As we use an extremely simple
framework, we also discuss the generality of the results. In section 4 we discuss positive policy
implications. We begin by exploring how changes in government spending can affect aggregate
output in our framework. We show that under the same conditions which give rise to the
possibility of perception driven business cycles, we also find that government spending can
cause generalized booms even if the spending is limited to one sector of the economy. We also
examine the implications of our framework for monetary policy in a sticky price setting. The
main aspect we emphasize here is that the concept of a natural rate should not be viewed
as primarily determined by productive capacity, frictions and preferences, and independent of
what may appear as demand shocks. Instead we show that in our framework the natural rate
2 If workers are fully mobile between sectors, wasteful government spending cannot create such gains from
trade and therefore cannot have a multiplier effect. Therefore, our framework gives a reason why government
expenditures may be used in the short run to stimulate economy activity while such effort would be unproductive
in the long run, as workers are expected to be mobile in the long run.
3 It is also the case that monetary policy shocks can change the natural rate in our framework.
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is inherently linked to changes in demand type shocks, and therefore even in such a simple
model one cannot view changes in demand as inducing movement along a stable Phillips curve.
The Phillips curve itself will change with demand shocks. Hence in our setup it is not the case
that a supply shock renders a different type of inflation-output trade-off than that associated
with a demand shock. Finally, in section 5, we discuss some normative issues and explore the
relevance of our main assumption regarding labor market segmentation using PSID data over
the period 1968-2007.
Note that throughout our analysis, our aim is to present the main ideas in the simplest
possible setting. The results presented here are therefore all of a qualitative nature, and we
present examples that can be solved analytically as much as possible. Given our focus on
clarifying the qualitative implications for limited labor mobility, we leave for further exploration
the quantitative implications of our framework.
2 A simple framework for exploring the relationship be-
tween gains from trade and macroeconomic outcomes
2.1 Fundamentals
Let us begin by focusing on the simplest of cases in which we can explicitly model gains from
trade : a two sector model, with two types of agents, one current period and a continuation
value for the investment good.4 One sector produces consumptions goods, and the second
sector produces investment goods, that is, goods that do not provide immediate utility. The
two types of agents are denoted by i = 1, 2, where there is a mass ni of agents of type i.
In period 1, an agent i will have choices in terms of how much of the consumption good to
purchase, Ci, how much of the investment good to purchase, Ki, and how much labor to
supply, Li. The production functions for consumption and investment goods satisfy constant
returns to scale and depend on the amount hired of each type of labor, i = 1, 2. If the labor
from the different types of worker enter additively in the production function, we will refer to
this as a homogeneous labor market. If only one type of labor enters productively into the
production of a good, we will refer to this as a situation with specialized labor markets. The
function FC(LC1, LC2) will represent the amount of consumption produced when the amount
LCi of type i labor is employed in the consumption good sector. Similarly FK(LK1, LK2) will
represent the production function in the investment sector. These production functions are
assumed to be concave and satisfy constant returns to scale. 5
The preferences of agent i over consumption and labor in the current period are given by
the utility function U i(Ci, 1 − Li), where U(·, ·) is concave, with both consumption (Ci) and
leisure (1 − Li) being normal goods. This implies that U1 > 0, U2 > 0 , U22 − U12U2U1 < 0 and
4 This framework embeds fully specified dynamic models, as we will show by means of example
5For simplicity, we are assuming here that agents are not initially endowed with capital. Therefore only
labor serves as an input in the current period. The results of this section can be easily extended to the case
where agents are initially endowed with capital and capital enter as a factor of production in the production of
capital goods and/or investment goods. In particular, Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold in this modified
setting. The only difference is for Proposition 3 which would need to be extended to include a restriction on
the effects of capital mobility between sectors.
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−U21 + U11U2U1 < 0.6
Let us denote by V˜ i(Ki;S) the value function of agent i who enters next period in state
S with Ki units of capital. The state vector S that is relevant for the individual can be
seen as composed of predetermined endogenous variables and of exogenous driving forces. The
predetermined variables entering V˜ could be the aggregate values of the capital stocks for each
type of worker (n1K1 and n2K2), while the exogenous random variables affecting the system
could include the aggregate technology realization.7 In the current period, the agent will be
assumed to have information that he perceives as relevant for predicting S, and this information
will be denoted Ω. This information could be individual specific, but for our purpose we will
assume that it represents common information. The objective of the agent can then be expressed
as maximizing
U i(Ci, 1− Li) + E[βV˜ i(Ki;S)/Ω],
where E[·/Ω] is the conditional expectation operator based on information Ω, and β is the
discount factor. Note that Ω may content S.
To simply notation it is useful to define the expected continuation value function V i(·) for
agent i as
V i(Ki; Ω) = E[βV˜ i(Ki;S)/Ω].
We will refer to V i(·) simply as the agent’s value function.
2.2 Modeling changes in expectations
The important aspect to note about V i(·) is its dependence on the information Ω. In particular,
we will be interested in knowing under what conditions changes in the exogenous components
of Ω can cause business cycle type fluctuations, that is, we are interested in knowing when
changes in the information set that agents perceive as being relevant for predicting the future
may cause booms or busts8. We purposely choose to specify future preferences simply in terms
of a continuation function as this will allow us to disregard all sorts of issues related to future
adjustment of individuals. For example, even if we will sometimes assume that an individual’s
labor is specific to a sector, we are not assuming that this cannot be modified in the future.
As we do not need to take a precise stand on how such issues play out in the future, and we
want to highlight our results as easily as possible, the specification in terms of a continuation
functions is very useful and without much loss of generality. For now all that we require about
V i(Ki; Ω) is that it be continuous, differentiable, with ∂V
i(Ki;Ω)
∂Ki
≥ 0, and ∂2V i(Ki;Ω)
∂Ki
≤ 0 .
It will be helpful to divide Ω into two sets. First we will denote by Ω1 information variables
which are exogenous to the system, but which individuals consider relevant for predicting future
state variables. For simplicity, we will treat Ω1 as a scalar. Ω1 could represent a current signal
that agents receive regarding the future realization of exogenous driving forces impinging on
6 Subscripts on functions represent partial derivatives.
7 There may also be a third type of variable that enters S which are economy wide endogenous variables such
as prices. However, since such variables are themselves in equilibrium functions of the predetermined variables
and the driving forces, there is no loss of generality in not including them in our specification of V˜ (·).
8 Depending on the context, a change in the exogenous components of Ω can be a change in the conditional
expectation of S when agents are learning or receiving news, but can also correspond to a change in some higher
moments of the distribution of S, for instance a change in the (perceived) variance of S.
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the system, or alternatively Ω1 could simply represent a perception (sentiment) that agents
share. Ω2 represents a set of endogenous variables that agents may want to use to predict
future states, such as past prices or other past market outcomes.
2.3 Competitive equilibrium
The decision problem for individual i can be expressed as
max
Ci,Ki,Li
U i(Ci, 1− Li) + V i(Ki; Ω)
subject to
Ci + pKi = wiLi,
where the agent takes prices and wages as given, wi represents the wage paid to agents of type
i, and the consumption good is the numeraire. The problem for the consumption good firm is
maxC −
∑
i
wiLCi
subject to
C = FC(LC1, LC2).
The problem for investment good firms is
maxPK −
∑
i
wilK1
subject to
K = FK(LK1, LK2).
In this environment, a Walrasian equilibrium will need to satisfy,9 for i = 1, 2
U i2(C
i, 1− Li)
U i1(C
i, 1− Li) = w
i,
V i1 (K
i; Ω)
U i1(C
i, 1− Li) = p,
Ci + pKi = wiLi,
FCi (n
1LC1, n2LC2) = wi,
PFKi (n
1LK1, n2LK2) = wi,
Li = LCi + LKi,
n1C1 + n2C2 = F
C(n1LC1, n2LC2),
n1K1 + n2K2 = FK(n1LK1, n2LK2).
9 By Walras’ Law, one condition here is redundant.
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3 Expectation driven fluctuations
3.1 Definitions
We are interested in examining whether, and under what conditions, changes in Ω1 (the exo-
genous component in the agents’ information set) can cause positive co-movements between
consumption, investment and employment. For this purpose, we define a positive change in Ω1
such that it corresponds to an increase in the perceived marginal (private) return to capital,
that is, ∂
2V i(Ki;Ω)
∂K1∂Ω1
> 0. We will be interested in isolating conditions under which an increase in
agents’ perception of the marginal return to capital – that is, an increase in Ω1– can cause a
generalized boom, and when a decrease can cause a bust.10 Since the notion of a generalized
boom and bust can have different meanings in a heterogeneous agent economy, we define the
following terms:
Definition 1 The economy exhibits positive co-movement when aggregate consumption, ag-
gregate investment, and employment of each type of worker all strictly increase together, or
strictly decrease together.
Definition 2 The economy exhibits (strong) individual positive co-movement if the indi-
vidual levels of consumption, investment and hours worked for each agent move weakly (strictly)
in the same direction.
Definition 3 The economy exhibits positive price and quantity co-movement when wages
and the price of capital move weakly in the same direction as aggregate consumption, investment
and employment.
It should be clear that strong individual positive co-movement implies individual positive
co-movement, which in turn implies positive co-movement. The only difference between strong
individual positive co-movement and individual positive co-movement is that in the latter case
some individual level variables are allowed to remain unchanged. Equipped with these defini-
tions we can now explore under what conditions changes in perception regarding the marginal
value of capital, represented by changes in Ω1, can cause positive co-movement.
When looking at how changes in perceptions may affect the economy, it is unclear what
concepts defined above one may want the economy to satisfy to be considered most empirically
interesting. Positive co-movement between investment, consumption and employment is one of
the central established features of business cycles, so it is certainly desirable that it is satisfied.
Since our framework allows for two types of workers, and since we do not believe that negative
correlation between the employment of different types of workers is a key feature of business
cycles, we will focus mainly on situations that satisfy our definition of positive co-movement.
Nonetheless, since we also know of no evidence suggesting that the main positive co-movements
in aggregate consumption and investment hide substantial heterogeneity in the sign of the
response at the individual level, we believe that it is also interesting to know whether a model
can produce positive co-movement by relying only on individual level positive co-movement.
Whether the individual level outcomes for consumption and investment should move strongly
10 Answering this question simply requires doing a comparative static exercise on the above set of equilibrium
equations.
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or weakly with the aggregates appears to us as being of minor importance. With respect to
positive price and quantity co-movement, the desirability of this feature may depend on what
type of capital one may be considering. We believe that positive price-quantity co-movement
is a potentially desirable feature as real wages are generally viewed as pro-cyclical; and the
price of capital– which we view as representing either the price of real-estate or value of capital
represented by the stock market– is also seen as being pro-cyclical. However, if one views the
price of capital as the price of equipment it is unclear whether one would want changes in
perception to increase or decrease such a price.
3.2 Three propositions
Our first proposition is meant to illustrate that the Walrasian framework is not very restrictive in
terms of it capacity to generate interesting co-movements in response to changes in perceptions.
In effect, it only places quite mild restrictions in the sense that it cannot generate strong
individual positive co-movement.
Proposition 1 The Walrasian equilibrium of our economy can simultaneously exhibit individ-
ual positive co-movement and positive price-quantity co-movement in response to a change in
Ω1, but it cannot exhibit strong individual co-movement.
To illustrate the first part of this proposition, we provide the following example. The proof
of the second part of the proposition is given in the appendix. In this example the function
V (·) is taken as data. Later in this section we will provide examples where V (·) can be derived
from more primitive assumptions.
Example : Preferences for producer of type 1 agent are given by
U1(C1, L
1) = ln(C1) + ν(1− L1),
V 1(K1,Ω1) = φΩ1 ln(K
1),
and preferences of type 2 are
U2(C2, L2) = ln(C2 − aL2),
V 2(K2,Ω1) = ψΩ1 ln(K
2).
The production function for consumption goods is C = L1; that is only type 1 can produce
consumption goods. The production of investment goods is K = L2; that is only type 2 can
produce investment goods. There is a mass one half of each type of individual.
The solution for this example is
L2 =
√
2Ω1φ(1+ψΩ1)
aν(2+Ω1ψ)
), L1 = 1
ν
+ Ω1φ
ν
,
P = aL2, I2 =
PΩ1ψ
(1+Ω1ψ)2a
I1 =
P (2+ψΩ1)
2a(1+ψΩ1)
, C2 = PI1,
C1 = 1
ν
,
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As can be seen, all these quantities increase with an increase in Ω1 except for C
1, which
is independent of Ω1. Hence in this example an increase in Ω1 leads to individual positive
co-movement. Moreover, both the price of capital and the average wage (in consumption units)
increase and therefore it also exhibits positive price-quantity co-movement. The intuition for
this result is the following: an increase in Ω1 increases the demand for capital. This increase in
demand increases the price of the investment good. As the utility function of the capital good
workers shows zero wealth effect in labor supply, they will respond by producing more capital,
accepting more consumption in exchange. As consumption of the consumption good worker is
constant, consumption production needs to increase with investment production. Therefore,
employment in the two sectors also increase.
Note that the only restriction being imposed by Proposition 1 on the Walrasian equilibrium
is that not all current decision variables of individuals can strictly increase in response to a
perceived change in the marginal value of capital. At least one variable for one individual must
stay the same or decrease.11 This restriction may appear very minor, which we believe is the
right interpretation. However, it should be noted that in the case where we impose a repre-
sentative agent structure, it implies the stronger result that aggregate positive co-movement is
not possible.
Corollary 1 If we have a representative agent, in the sense that the preferences of agents 1
and 2 are identical and their labor is perfectly homogeneous, then the Walrasian equilibrium of
the economy cannot exhibit positive aggregate co-movement in response to a change in Ω1.
Corollary 1 echoes the well known result of Barro and King [1984] whereby demand distur-
bances were shown not to be able to generate positive co-movement between consumption and
employment in a representative agent setup. In Barro and King [1984], the result was stated
in a one sector model, and can seen very easily by examining the labor market equilibrium
condition:
U2(C, 1− L)
U1(C, 1− L) = F1(L).
Under the condition that F11 ≤ 0 and both consumption and leisure are normal, then it follows
from total differentiation of that equation that consumption and labor must move in opposite
directions when responding to changes in perceptions. Corollary 1 simply provides an extension
to the two sector model.12
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 suggest that if one is interested in understanding perception
driven business cycles, remaining in a Walrasian equilibrium framework may be promising but
in such a case it is necessary to drop the representative agent structure. However, what this
proposition does not tell us is what aspect of the representative agent framework should be
dropped: is it the identical preferences or the differences in labor. Proposition 2 addresses this
issue.
11 While Proposition 1 indicates that individual positive co-movement induced by a change in perception can
arise in a Walrasian setting, it is worth noting that such an outcome– where there is no decrease in any of the
individual outcomes – arises only when there is constant dis-utility of work. In contrast, aggregate positive
co-movement induced by perception does not rely on such a linearity assumption.
12 See also Beaudry and Portier [2007] for a related discussion.
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Proposition 2 If labor is homogeneous, the Walrasian equilibrium of our economy cannot
exhibit positive co-movement in response to a change in Ω1. In contrast, if preferences are
identical but labor markets are specialized, then the Walrasian equilibrium of our economy can
exhibit positive co-movement, positive individual co-movement and positive price-quantity co-
movement.
Proposition 2 indicates that short run labor market segmentation may be a key feature
for understanding certain aspects of business cycle phenomena. In particular the proposition
highlights that it is not preference heterogeneity that is essential for generating perception
driven positive co-movement in our Walrasian setting but instead it is the notion that not all
agents are equally valuable at producing all goods in the short run. When agents are specialized
in the goods they can produce in the short run, this creates a situation where there are explicit
gains from trade between individuals. Accordingly, we interpret Proposition 2 as indicating why
it may be relevant to build macroeconomic models where there are explicit gains from trade in
the goods markets between individuals. The reason why labor market specialization can support
perception driven booms and busts is that the change in perception changes the desirable trades
between individuals. For example, when returns to capital accumulation appear high, agents
in the consumption sector want to trade with workers in the investment sector. Such gains
from trade therefore favor a simultaneous increase in the production of both consumption and
investment goods.
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that perception driven positive co-movement is possible in
our simple Walrasian framework, but they do not indicate whether such outcomes can arise in
reasonable setups, or whether they require strong additional assumptions. Accordingly, our aim
now is to derive a set of sufficient conditions for the economy to exhibit positive aggregate co-
movement in response to an increase in Ω1. To this end, as suggested by Proposition 2, we will
assume that agents are specialized in production in the short run, that is, we will assume that
agents of type 1 can only produce the consumption good in the short run, while agent of type
2 can only produce the investment good, and we look for sufficient conditions whereby changes
in perceptions can cause positive co-movement. As these production functions have constant
returns to scale, there is no loss of generality to assuming that one unit of labor produces one
unit of output in each sector.
The sufficient conditions for perception driven positive co-movement can be stated in terms
of the primitives U i(·) and V i(·). However, this results in very unintuitive expressions. For
this reason, we will instead proceed by presenting sufficient conditions in terms of demand and
supply functions. In particular, let us define the capital demand function, Ki(p, wi; Ω), the con-
sumption demand function, Ci(p, wi; Ω), and the labor supply function of agent i, Li(p, wi; Ω),
as the functions that solve the optimization problem
max
Ci,Ki,Li
U(Ci, 1− Li) + V i(Ki; Ω)
subject to
Ci + pKi = wiLi.
Sufficient conditions for an increase in Ω1 to induce positive aggregate co-movement are given
in Proposition 3.
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Proposition 3 If workers are specialized across sectors in the short run, and if the continua-
tion value for each agent is of the form V i(Ki; Ω1), with V
i
12 > 0, then an increase in Ω1 will be
associated with positive aggregate co-movement (and positive quantity and price co-movement)
if
(i) an increase in w2 does not decrease the labor supply of type 2, that is, ∂L
2
∂w2
≥ 0,
(ii) an increase in the price of capital does not decrease labor supply of either type of agent,
that is, ∂L
i
∂p
≥ 0 for i = 1, 2.
(iii) An increase in the price of capital leads to a decrease in aggregate capital demand when
including the income effect induced on type 2 agents, that is, ∂K
1
∂p
+ ∂K
2
∂p
+ ∂K
2
∂w2
< 0.
Proposition 3 highlights a set of conditions which together are sufficient to support percep-
tion driven aggregate co-movements. Let us emphasize that substantially weaker conditions
can be found but they are not very elegant to state. For example, the effect of an increase in
the price of capital on labor supply can be negative, as long as it is not too negative. Similarly,
the proposition is stated for the case where agents only use exogenous information Ω1 to pre-
dict future states (Ω2 is either empty or does not affect the marginal return to capital). This
again is much stronger than needed to get positive co-movement, but it greatly simplifies the
proposition.
The main conditions in Proposition 3 are easy to interpret. The first condition simply states
that the labor supply of agents in the capital goods sector must respond non-negatively to an
increase in their wage, that is , it must be that the substitution effect of an increase in wages
dominates the income effect in this sector. As a change in wages here corresponds to a change
holding all future variables constant (including expected future wages as predicted by Ω1), this
condition appears very reasonable. It is quite obvious why such a condition will need to hold.
If an increase in the perceived return to capital is to cause a boom, it will need to work though
an increase in employment of capital sector workers. Such an increase in unlikely to materialize
unless an increased demand for workers in this sector leads to increased employment.
More generally, to understand the role of the three conditions in Proposition 3 it is helpful
to notice that the model equilibrium conditions can be reduced to an equilibrium condition in
the capital goods sector. Using the constant returns to scale assumption, and the fact that
the firm’s first order conditions imply – given the simple one-to-one production technology –
that w2 = p and w1 = 1 (where 1 is the price of the consumption good), we can write the
equilibrium condition in the capital sector as:
K1(p, 1; Ω1) +K
2(p, p; Ω1) = L
2(p, p; Ω1).
The left side of this equation is the aggregate capital demand curve, and the right side is the
aggregate capital supply curve. Conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3 guarantee that the
capital supply function is (weakly) upward sloping, and condition (iii) guarantees that the
demand is downward sloping, as illustrated in Figure 1.
In other words, these conditions imply that this market is of the textbook type. Hence,
Proposition 3 can be interpreted as indicating that perceptions driven aggregate co-movement
will arise if the market for capital is well behaved and the labor market is segmented in the
short run. The reason why we obtain positive co-movement in consumption and investment
in this setup derives directly from the intra-temporal gains from trade induced by the labor
market segmentation. When Ω1 increases, consumption sector agents want to buy capital from
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Figure 1: Illustration of the Sufficient Conditions of Proposition 3
K
p
K
s = L
2 (p,
p; Ω1
)
K d
= K 1
(p, 1; Ω
1 ) +K 2
(p, p; Ω
1 )
This economy satisfies the sufficient conditions of Proposition 3: aggregate capital supply is
(weakly) upward sloping and aggregate capital demand is downward sloping.
workers in the capital goods sector. With an upward sloping labor supply curve, the capital
goods sector workers will respond to this new demand by favoring a greater trade flow between
the two types of workers, which corresponds to an increase in economic activity. It could be the
case that both types of agents reduce their purchase of their own good to offset these increased
interpersonal transactions, but under the conditions of Proposition 3 this won’t happen. This
is why positive perceptions about the future can cause a generalized boom in the presence of
explicit gains from trade, while such positive co-movement would not be possible – as noted in
Proposition 2 – if labor markets were homogeneous.
We could at this point try to provide sufficient conditions for an increase in Ω1 to be
associated with individual positive co-movement. Although it is rather easy to build examples
where this property is satisfied, we have not found any very insightful sufficient conditions,13
and accordingly we have not chosen to pursue this issue further.14
13 For example, if we want capital purchases for type 1 individuals to respond positively to an increase in Ω1,
we need
−∂K
1(P, 1; Ω1)
∂P
dP
dΩ1
<
∂K1(P, 1; Ω1)
∂Ω1
,
where dPdΩ1 is implicitly defined by the total derivative of P with respect to Ω1.
14 It should be noted that individual positive co-movement requires quite restrictive assumptions. For example
it generally requires, among others, that leisure enter linearly in the utility of the consumption sector workers
and that there be no decreasing returns to labor in the production of consumption goods. Accordingly, we view
individual positive co-movement as a rather knife edge possibility within a Walrasian framework.
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3.3 Some explicit dynamic examples
In this section we want to present two simple examples of economic environments where in-
creases in the perceived return to capital or decreases in its perceived risk can cause a boom,
while decreases in the perceived return or increases in perceived risk can cause a bust. We have
chosen examples that can be solved explicitly, as to best illustrate our results. As is well known,
it is difficult to get explicit solutions in dynamic general equilibrium models and accordingly we
must resort to highly simplified environments. We begin by an overlapping generation model
with complete depreciation, and complete sector specialization. Then we present an infinitely
lived agent setup with incomplete depreciation. A special case of the second example will be
later used to analyze monetary policy with sticky prices.
Example 1 : An overlapping generation model with changes in risk perception
Agents live for two periods, and have preferences given by
(Cyit )
1−σ
1− σ + ν(1− L
i
t) + Et
(Coit+1)
1−σ
1− σ
with σ ≥ 0. In the first period of their life they can consume, supply labor and buy capital. Cyit
represents the consumption of agent i when young at time t, and Coit represents the consumption
of the old of period t. In the second period they can consume the returns from their capital.
Capital is assumed to fully depreciate after one period. Agents of type 1 can only produce
consumption goods while agents of type 2 can only produce capital goods. We will let Kit
represent the capital bought by agent i at time t. Both labor and capital can be used to
produce consumption goods according to the production function Ct = AtKt + L
1
t . At is iid,
log-normally distributed with mean 1 and variance v2t . The production of the capital good is
given by Kt+1 = L
2
t . We assume that in period t agents receive a perfect signal about v
2
t+1,
that is, Ω1t = v
2
t+1. The continuation value function for this example can be shown to be given
by V (Kit+1,Ω1t) = (1 + Ω1t)
− 1
2
σ(1−σ) (Kit+1)1−σ
1−σ .
The solution to this example is Pt =
(
1+Ω1t
)−σ
2
1−σ
2−σ , Cy1t = ν
− 1
σ , Cy2t =
(
1
ν
) 1
σ
(
1+Ω1t
)− 1
2
1−σ
2−σ ,
Cot = AtKt, K
1
t+1 = ν
− 1
σ
(
1 + Ω1t
)− 1
2
(1−σ)2
2−σ and K2t+1 = ν
− 1
σ
(
1 + Ω1t
)− (1−σ)
2
From this solution, it can be verified that an expected increase in risk Ω1t will lead to
positive individual co-movement as long as σ < 1. Note that σ < 1 is sufficient here for wages
to have a positive effect on labor supply and for an expected increase in Ω1t to cause a decrease
in the perceived return to capital, and therefore a bust.
Example 2: A model with infinitely lived agents
Consider an environment where we have two infinitely lived agents. The labor of agents of type
1 is valuable only in the production of consumption goods and their preferences are given by
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
lnC1t+j + ν(1− L1t+j)
)
.
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The second type of agents can only produce investment goods and their preferences are given
by
∞∑
j=0
βj ln
(
C2t+j −
(L2t+j)
1+γ
1 + γ
)
, γ > 0.
Capital depreciates at rate δ such that the aggregate capital stock satisfies Kt+1 = (1−δ)Kt+It,
where the production of capital is given by It = L
2
2. The production of the consumption good
is given by Ct = AtKt + L
1
t . Perfect substitutability between capital and labor allows for an
analytical solution.
The return on capital, At, is assumed to be i.i.d., with mean zero and composed of two
independent components: At = t + st−N . The t component is assumed to be non-predictable,
while the second component st−N is a news, i.e. it is assumed to be known to agents N
periods before it actually affects returns. Therefore the set of exogenous information relevant
for individuals when making predictions at time i is Ω1t = {st, . . . , st−N−1}.
In this setup much of the equilibrium outcome can be solved analytically. In particular, the
equilibrium will be characterized by the price of capital at time t be given by
Pt = β
(
N−1∑
j=0
(β(1− δ))N−1−jst−j
)
.
Investment and employment in the investment sector are given by
It = L
2
t =
(
β
N−1∑
j=0
(β(1− δ))N−1−jst−j
) 1
γ
.
Aggregate consumption and employment in the consumption sector are given by
Ct =
1
ν
+
(
β
∑N−1
j=0 (β(1− δ))N−1−jst−j
) 1+γ
γ
1 + γ
+ µt,
L1t =
1
ν
+
(
β
∑N−1
j=0 (β(1− δ))N−1−jst−j
) 1+γ
γ
1 + γ
+ µt − AtKt
where µt is the marginal utility of consumption of type two agents. While we are not able to
provide a explicit expression for µt, it can be deduced that it is increasing with the signal st.
From the above equations we can see how the elements in Ω1t affect consumption and invest-
ment. In particular, consider the dynamics induced when agents receive a positive realization
of st, that is, agents at time t receive a signal telling them that returns to capital will likely be
high in N periods. This immediately gives rise to an increase in investment, as the payoff to
investment has increased. Moreover, it leads to an increase in aggregate consumption as the
positive signal has increased the gains from trade between type 1 and type 2 agents. Positive
co-movement therefore arises as investment increases and workers in the investment sector buy
more consumption goods. Over time the effect of this signal builds up as the perceived higher-
than-normal return to capital becomes more salient. Eventually, the period of high perceived
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return comes to an end – with or without the returns actually being confirmed – and then the
economy enters a recession as investment falls back to normal and the economy liquidates its
capital stock.
As the marginal utility term µt in the above equations cannot be solved explicitly, it is of
interest to compare the solution with a case which can be entirely solved. This corresponds
to the situation where the type 2 agents are myopic (meaning that they only make static
consumption/leisure decisions). In this case, Pt, It and L
2
t all take the exact same form as
given above. All that changes is Ct and L
1
t , which are now given by
Ct =
1
ν
+
(
β
N−1∑
j=0
(β(1− δ))N−1−jst−j
) 1+γ
γ
,
L1t =
1
ν
+
(
β
N−1∑
j=0
(β(1− δ))N−1−jst−j
) 1+γ
γ
− AtKt.
Here, when type 2 agents are myopic, the qualitative dynamics induced by increases in the
perceived returns to capital are essentially the same as when type 2 agents optimize over
time. For this reason, we believe that the case where type 2 agents are myopic provides
a tractable example that can be used effectively to explore implications of specialized labor
markets, knowing that the qualitative properties are very close to the case where type 2 agents
optimize fully over time. In a later section we will use this extended example where type 2
agents are myopic to examine some implication of sticky prices.
3.4 Allowing for contingent claims
Our analysis may at first pass appear restrictive since it does not include financial claims that
agents trade among themselves. In particular, one may want to allow agents to trade in a full
set of state contingent claims markets, where the contingencies would be the different possible
realizations of the random variables in S. However, after closer inspection, we can show that
our analysis is not restrictive on this front, as such trades can be viewed as being subsumed in
the functions V i(·). To see this suppose, suppose that agents can trade in contingent claims
markets and therefore can enter a period with a portfolio of contingent claims denoted {yin}Nn=1,
where N is the number of potential realization of S, and yin represents the number of claims to
be paid in state n held by agent i . The problem facing the agent would then correspond to
max
Ci,Li,{yin}Nn=1
U(Ci, 1− Li) + E
[
βV˜ i({yin}Nn=1;S)/Ω
]
subject to
Ci +
∑
n
pny
i
n = w
iLi,
where pn are the prices of contingent claims and V˜
i({yin}Nn=1;S) represents the value of entering
a period with the portfolio {yin}Nn=1 when the state is S. Now consider the following sequence
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of budget constraints
Ci + pKi = wiLi,∑
n
pny
i
n =
∑
n
pnrnK
i,
where rn are the returns on capital in the different states. In this sequence of budget constraints,
an individual would first face a budget constraint where he decides how much capital to buy and
then uses the capital to purchase continent claims. The important aspect to notice is that this
sequence of budget constraints is actually equivalent to the budget constraint Ci +
∑
n pny
i
n =
wiLi if pKi =
∑
n pnrnK
i. But this last condition is assured by arbitrage. Hence, we can view
the problem facing an agent in the contingent claims setup as one where the agent first chooses
Ci, Ki and Li, and then chooses {yin}Nn=1. The problem facing the agent initially can therefore
be rewritten as
max
Ci,Li,Ki
U(Ci, 1− Li) + V (Ki; Ω, {Pn}Nn=1)
subject to
Ci + pKi = wiLi,
where V
(
Ki; Ω, {Pn}Nn=1
)
is now the value function associated with
V (Ki; Ω, {Pn}Nn=1) = max{yin}Nn=1
E
[
βV˜ i({yin}Nn=1;S1, S2)/Ω, S1
]
subject to ∑
n
pny
i
n =
∑
n
pnrnK
i.
Given this two step interpretation, the problem facing the agent when deciding Ci, Ki and Li
is now almost identical to what we had in the previous section with the exception that now
the state contingent prices {Pn}Nn=1 are added arguments in the value function. However, in
equilibrium the state contingent prices themselves will be a function of Ω and therefore they
can be replaced in the value function of the form V (Ki; Ω, {Pn}Nn=1), to give us back a value
function of the form V (Ki; Ω). Accordingly, our Propositions 1 to 3 can be seen as applying
equally well to a situation where agents have access to contingent claims on the realizations of S
or when they do not. The difference between the two cases will affect the shape of the relevant
value function, but that does not impinge on the propositions. Moreover, it is important to
note that in this argument we have not placed any non-negativity constraint on K as allowing
for such a possibility is necessary for the equivalence result.
3.5 Ex-ante markets on perceptions Ω1
We have shown that perception driven booms and busts (e.g. based either on hard information,
rumor or fad) can arise quite naturally in environments where there are explicit gains from trade
between individuals because of short run labor market specialization. Moreover we have shown
that perception driven fluctuations can arise even in situation where agents can share risk
regarding the outcomes on which they make perceptions. However, we have not yet examined
what would happen if we allowed people to insure themselves against changes in perceptions
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themselves. While we view the existence of a full set of such markets somewhat unlikely, in
this section we will discuss how our analysis is modified if we allow agents to meet before
the realization of Ω1 and trade contingent claims markets written on the realizations of the
perceptions themselves. If we assume that Ω1 can take on M values (m = 1, ..,M), and the
probability of each of these outcomes is given by Πm, then the problem facing agent i in the
case where ex-ante markets contingent on Ω1 are available is
max
{Cim}Mm=1,{Kim}Mm=1,{Lim}Mm=1
M∑
m=1
Πm[U
i(Cim, 1− Lim) + V i(Kim; Ω1m,Ω2)]
subject to
M∑
m=1
P cmC
i
m +
M∑
m=1
P ImK
i
m =
M∑
m=1
wimL
i
m,
where, for example, Cim is the claims of agent i for consumptions goods when the realization
of Ω1 is Ω1m, and P
c
m is the price of this contingent claim.
For this case, we have results which complement those in Propositions 1 to 3, that is,
Proposition 4 When agents are allowed to trade contingent claims written on the realization
of Ω1, then positive co-movement is not possible if either labor is homogeneous or if labor
specialized and the preferences U(C, 1− L) are separable.
Proposition 4 indicates that in the presence of ex-ante claims on Ω1, it is much more difficult
to generate positive co-movement driven by changes in perception even in the case where
agents are specialized, as it requires that preferences be non-separable. Accordingly, we take
Proposition 3 and 4 as indicating that positive co-movement driven by perception can arise
quite easily when agents are specialized and they can’t diversify all the risk associated with
changes in perceptions about the future. However such positive co-movement is much less
likely to arise if ex-ante markets for Ω1 exist. In particular, when agents are specialized and
preferences are separable, the insurance provided by ex-ante markets written on Ω1 results in
the consumption of both agents becoming independent of the realization of Ω1, and therefore
positive co-movement is not possible.
4 Positive policy analysis
In section 3 we established that introducing explicit intra-temporal gains from trade between
individuals (due to labor market segmentation) in a macroeconomic model offers an environment
where changes in perceptions about the future can cause business fluctuations under seemingly
reasonable conditions. In this section we want to explore whether such a framework also
provides new insight into fiscal and monetary issues. We begin by exploring the link between
labor market specialization and the effects of fiscal policy within a Walrasian framework. Then
we will explore a sticky price model with explicit gains from trade which we present as a simple
extension of the baseline New Keynesian model.
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4.1 Fiscal policy
4.1.1 Introducing a government
We continue to work here with the setup of Section 2 where we have two types of individuals
who can differ in terms both of their preferences (represented by U i(Ci, 1−Li) and V i(Ki; Ω))
and in terms of value of their labor in the production of the two different goods. In this
environment, we want to explore the effect of temporary changes in government spending.
To keep the discussion as simple as possible, we choose to look at fiscal policies which are
composed only of current government expenditures paid by current taxes. This clearly makes
the policy temporary and will allow us to side step any issues related to future expectations of
policy and of non-Ricardian equivalence. A fiscal policy will therefore be composed of current
expenditure by the government in terms of consumption goods, GC , an expenditure in terms
of capital goods, GK , a lump sum tax on type 1 individuals, T 1, and a lump sum tax on type
2 individuals, T 2. The balanced budget requirement imposes:
GC + pGK = T 1 + T 2.
We will assume that type 1 is taxed a proportion α of total expenditure, that is T 1 = α(GC +
GK), with the remaining fraction corresponding to the tax on type 2 individuals. A common
question that arises about fiscal policy is whether and under what conditions (if any) can a
temporary increase in government spending create a multiplier effect, in the sense that the total
effect of a government spending increase of one dollar leads to an effect on aggregate output
of more than one dollar. It is well known that in a Walrasian setting temporary increases in
government spending generally lead to a multiplier that is less than one as the new expenditures
tend to crowd out expenditures by households on either investment or consumption purchases.
In this subsection we want to examine whether the introduction of explicit gains from trade
between individuals changes such results. To present our results as clearly as possible, and
to help shed new light on the issue, it is helpful to focus on government expenditures that
are directed only at one sector. To this end, let us consider a fiscal policy which is directed
at purchasing investment goods, where these goods are either wasted or enter separately into
households’ preferences.
To understand if a change in GK can have a multiplier greater than one it is helpful to
first break down the question into two simpler elements: (i) can an increase in government
purchases of capital goods cause private agents to buy more capital goods, if so we would call
this an amplification effect, and (ii) can an increase in government purchases of capital goods
cause private agents to consume more consumption goods, if so we would call this a spillover
effect. The following propositions address these issues.
Proposition 5 If the preferences of agents are identical and their labor is perfectly substitutable
(i.e. a representative agent setup), then an increase in government purchases of capital goods
cannot lead to either an increase in private purchase of either capital goods (no amplification
effect) or consumption goods (no spillover effect). Hence government purchases of investment
goods cannot in this case create positive aggregate co-movement nor create a multiplier greater
than one.
Proposition 5 echoes previous results regarding the crowding out effects of government
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spending in a Walrasian setting.15 As stated in the Proposition, when there is no explicit
gains from trade between individuals (i.e. a representative agent setup), an increase in public
spending tends to crowd-out private expenditures. In effect, in our setup, even if the public
purchase is directed only at capital goods, it tends to crowd out (at least weakly) private
expenditures on both consumption and capital goods. This result is rather intuitive. Within
a representative agent, the government purchase cannot increase the desire to trade as one
trades only with oneself, and any trades that are possible after the purchase by the government
were also possible before and therefore there is no reason to expect either amplification or
positive spill-over. However, the same logic does not follow once there is more than one type
of individual. If agents differ in their sector of employment, then the government purchase of
capital goods transfers income to capital goods producers which will generally lead them to
buy more consumptions goods. In fact, in such a case the government action is changing the
gains from trade between the different types of workers; it is favoring trade from the producers
of consumption goods – who need income to pay taxes– toward the producers of capital goods
– which have increased net revenues. While the precise outcomes can vary, Proposition 6
indicates that given the conditions under which we obtained perception driven fluctuations in
Section 3, we find that government expenditures can create spillovers and positive aggregate
co-movement.
Proposition 6 If the conditions of Proposition 3 are met, then an increase in government
purchases of capital goods will lead to an increase in private purchases of consumption goods
(a spillover effect), and create positive co-movement. However, it will not increase the private
purchase of capital goods (no amplification effect).
Recall that the conditions stated in Proposition 3 implied an upward sloping aggregate
capital supply curve and a downward sloping capital demand curve. In such a case, an increase
in government purchases of capital goods tends to shift out the aggregate demand for capital,
increasing the aggregate quantity purchased and increasing the price of capital. Individual
demand curves for capital tend to shift in because of the tax increases. Hence we can see
why there is no amplification effect as the equilibrium price of capital increases and agents
have downward sloping demand curves. However, through this process agents in the capital
sector are getting higher income which leads them to want to consume more. This is where
the gains from trade arise. The producers of consumptions goods are willing to trade with the
producers of capital goods as the added income will help them pay taxes. Could it be the case
that the income effect on the producers of capital is great enough to lead such producers to
actually substantially increase their purchase of capital and create amplification? Under the
assumptions of Proposition 6 this cannot happen since aggregate capital demand is downward
sloping.
Proposition 5 and 6 provide insight to how allowing for explicit gains from trade between
individuals can change the qualitative effects of fiscal policy. In particular, it is interesting to
note that the framework has the potential to explain why consumption may increase following
an increase in government purchases, as has been found empirically by Blanchard and Perotti
[2002], Fatas and Mihov [2001] and Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s [2007]. However, Proposition
15 See for example Baxter and King [1993], Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher [2004] and Ramey and Shapiro
[1998].
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6 does not address the issue of whether government spending can create multipliers greater than
one. In the case of purchases of investment goods, this would happen if the spillover effect on
consumption goods was large enough and that the crowding out effect on private investment is
not to important. While getting multiplier effects greater than one in our setting is not difficult,
it does depend on many issues. Since we have not found any insightful general conditions that
clarify when a multiplier greater or smaller than one may arise, we turn to now to illustrating
the possibilities and difficulties using simple examples.
4.1.2 Illustrating how taxing decisions affect the size of a government purchase
multiplier
This section will illustrate that the size of a government spending multiplier depends critically
on whether the spending package and taxes are set to create gains from trade or not. For
example, as will be shown, government spending that is associated with sectoral taxes which
are proportional to the sectoral expenditures creates no multiplier effect (multiplier equals one
at best). What is important for government spending to have a multiplier effect is that it
leads to differential income effects across agents, and it is these income effects that create gains
from trade. Interestingly, this analysis helps shed light on why private investment may be seen
as having a multiplier while government spending may not. The reason being that investment
driven by perception is an increase in demand that is not balanced in terms of its income effects
and hence creates gains from trade. Government policy can try to replicate such an effect but
it needs to not offset sectoral expenditure with equivalent sectoral taxes.
To see this mechanism, consider the same two period environment as we have been focusing
upon, that is, there are two types of agents with preferences
U i(Ci, Li) = lnCi + φ(1− li),
V i(Ki) = lnKi,
where agent 2 produces capital (one-to-one), and agent 1 produces the consumption good (one-
to-one). The price of consumption is normalized to 1, and P represents the relative price of
the investment good.
Let us assume that government spending takes the form of an expenditure of 1 (in units
of the numeraire) divided between investment goods and consumption goods. Let α be the
expenditure on investment goods (so that the real amount of investment purchased will be α
P
),
and 1− α the expenditure on consumptions goods.16 Total taxes need to be equal to 1, so let
us denote by β the lump sum tax imposed to the investment sector agent, while 1 − β is the
lump sum taxes imposed on the agent in the consumption good sector.
The budget constraint of agent 2 is C2 +PK2 = PL2− β, the first order conditions can be
expressed as
P
P (L2 −K2)− β = φ,
P
P (L2 −K2)− β =
1
K2
.
16 The policy could alternatively be specified in terms of real purchases of both goods. This slightly complicates
the algebra but provides very similar insights.
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The budget constraint of agent 1 is C1 +PK1 = L1− (1− β), the first order conditions can be
expressed as
1
(L1 − PK1)− (1− β) = φ,
P
(L1 − PK1)− (1− β) =
1
K1
.
The market clearing condition for the capital market is
L2 = K1 +K2 +
α
P
.
These five equations17 determine {L1, L2, K1, K2, P} as a function of the government policy
α and β.
In the case of no government spending, the equilibrium allocations are given by L1 = L2 = 2
φ
,
P = 1, K1 = K2 = 1
φ
. Therefore, GDP in consumption units is equal to C + pK = 4
φ
Assume now that the government spends a total of one (in units on consumption) on con-
sumption and investment goods. In such a case, it can be verified that GDP in consumption
units is equal to 4
φ
+ 1 + 2(α−β), so the multiplier is 1 + 2(α−β). If α = β then the multiplier
is simply one, as no gains from trade are created. The multiplier is maximized when all the
purchases are targeted at the investment sector (α = 1), and no taxes are paid in the invest-
ment sector (β = 0). This illustrates that government spending can have a greater effect when
sectoral spending is not offset by proportional sectoral taxes.18
4.1.3 Introducing an explicit government sector to illustrate how a large multiplier
can arise
In this second example we want to to illustrate a case where government purchases correspond
to the hiring of a particular set of workers, and how this leads to a multiplier of exactly two.
To this end, we take the same setup as above but we add one more type of agent. Agent 3 has
the same preferences as the others – i.e. ln(C3) + ν(1 − L3) + lnK3, with budget constraint
C3 + PK3 = w3L3. Agents of type 3 can only be hired by the government within the current
period and so their labor income corresponds to government expenditure: w3L3 = G, where G
is government spending. We assume for simplicity that G is either useless, or enters utility in a
separable manner, so its direct effect on decisions can be disregarded. We set taxes to be lump
sum and equal on both agent 1 and 2. This model can be solved explicitly, and gives a multiplier
of exactly two following an increase in government spending. What happens is that both agent
1 and 2 keep consuming and investing as before, but both work more to supply consumption
goods and investment goods to agent 3 who is the beneficiary of government spending.
17 This system can be quickly reduced to a system in 3 equations when noting that K2 = 1φ , PK
1 = 1φ , hence
the three relevant equations are PP (L2−K2)−β = φ,
1
(L1−PK1)−(1−β) = φ and L
2 = K1 +K2 + αP .
18 It may be more appropriate to calculate post spending GDP in baseline prices (– i.e., L1 + L2 instead of
PL2 + L1). In this case, GDP after spending is 4φ + 1 +
(α−β)(2−βφ)
1+φ(α−β) , which again implies a multiplier of 1 if α
equals β (sectoral balancing of expenditures and taxes).
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The equilibrium conditions in this case are:
P
P (L2 −K2)− G
2
= ν,
1
K2
= ν,
1
(L1 − PK1)− G
2
= ν,
1
K1
= Pν,
w3
w3L3 − PK3 = ν,
Pν
w3
=
1
K3
.
In this model, the solution takes the following form: P = 1 (hence the price of investment is
not affected by government spending), K3 = G
2
, K2 = 1
ν
, K1 = 1
ν
and therefore K = L2 = G
2
+ 2
ν
,
C1 = C2 = 1
ν
, C3 = G
2
and L1 = 2
ν
+ G
2
= C
Therefore an increase in G increases aggregate consumption, investment and employment.
Let us define GDP as C + PK + G. We therefore have GDP = 4
ν
+ 2G. The multiplier of
exactly 2 derived here is interesting as it arises from the fact that the government expenditure
creates income for type 3 individuals, which they use to buy goods from other agents. As
they use all their increased income to buy either consumption goods or investment goods, this
leads to an increase of both aggregate consumption and investment of the same amount as the
original outlay by the government. The other agents are willing to supply such goods to type
3 agents since they need the extra revenue to pay taxes. It is in this sense that the government
intervention is increasing the gains from trade between type 3 individuals and the others.
4.2 Sticky price, inflation and monetary policy
Up to now we have provided examples of how labor market segmentation – which gives rise
to gains from trade between individuals – can bring insights about the functioning of the
macroeconomy when prices adjust to to their Walrasian levels. In this section we want to
illustrate how introducing explicit gains from trade into a standard sticky price model can also
alter conventional wisdom regarding the determination of inflation and the role of monetary
policy in responding to “demand” shocks. In particular, we want to contrast the functioning of
a baseline New Keynesian model where there is a representative agent to one that we augment
to include gains from trade between individuals. The baseline model we have in mind is the
textbook example of Gal´ı [2008].
4.2.1 A standard New Keynesian model
Consider en environment with one representative agent who consumes an aggregate consump-
tion good that is a basket of monopolistically produced consumption goods indexed by j:
ct =
(∫ 1
0
c
ε−1
ε
jt dj
) ε
ε−1
.
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with ε > 1. This agent is infinitely lived and has preferences over consumption and leisure
given by ∑
βt (ln(cct) + Φ(1− `Ct)) ,
with 1 > β > 0 and Φ > 0.
Each monopoly j produces a variety of consumption good according to the following constant
return to scale technology:
Cjt = AtLjt,
where At is a technological shock. Prices are sticky and we assume Calvo price setting: each
consumption firm may reset its price with probability 1− θ in each period, θ ∈ [0, 1]. Finally,
there is a central bank that sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule.
In the flexible price allocations, labor is constant, so that natural output is given by ŷ nt = Ât
and the natural real interest rate, denoted ρ̂, satisfies ρ̂ nt = EtÂt+1− Ât (where hats denote log
deviations from the steady state).19 In the sticky price model, we define the output gap y˜t as
the deviation of output from the natural level ŷt − ŷ nt . The equilibrium allocations are given
by a dynamic IS equation, a New Keynesian Phillips curve and Taylor rule (that relates the
nominal interest rate to output gap and inflation):
y˜t = − (̂ıt − Etpit+1 − ρ̂ nt ) + Ety˜t+1,
pit = βEtpit+1 + λŷt,
+ Taylor rule,
where i is the nominal interest rate, pi the rate of inflation and where where λ is a function of
the model parameters.
What happens in this environment if agents expect At+1 to be high? This increases the
demand for current consumption through the expectation of future income. If the Taylor rule
is such that it does not immediately increase interest rates enough to fully offset the increased
demand, this will lead to inflation. In particular, let us focus on the New Keynesian Phillips
curve. The increased expectation of At+1 does not directly enter into this curve, and therefore
if a higher expectation for this variable leads to an increase in output it will necessarily place
upward pressure on inflation as the natural level of output is not affected by the more optimistic
expectation that increases the demand for consumption goods. Accordingly, it is optimal in such
a setting for the monetary authorities to completely offset such a demand shock by increasing
interest rates sufficiently to leave output unaffected. In contrast, if the shock was to At, which
would be referred to a supply shock as it changes the current capacity of the economy to produce,
it would be reasonable to accommodate the shock and let output increase while simultaneously
maintaining stable inflation. This set up provides a nice illustration of the textbook prescription
that in order to keep stable inflation, monetary authorities need to strongly counteract demand
shock but need to accommodate supply shocks. Moreover in this framework, if the economy
goes into recession (expansion) due to a fall (increase) in demand – as opposed to a reduction
in supply capacity – this should put substantial downward (upward) pressure on prices. We
now want to illustrate how such results change when we add another agent into this economy
such that there are now gains from trade between individuals.
19 Details of the main derivations of this section are presented in appendix C.
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4.2.2 Adding gains from trade
Let us consider the same simple New Keynesian setting which we now augment to include
explicit gains from trade between individuals. Some agents will produce the consumption
good and some the investment good. Although we allow for capital accumulation and agents
heterogeneity, we will make functional form assumptions to preserve tractability of the model.
When the number of investment good workers is driven to zero, the model will converge to the
simple New Keynesian model presented above.
The economy is populated of nC consumption good workers and nX investment good work-
ers. All agents consume an aggregate consumption good, that is a basket of monopolistically
produced consumption goods indexed by j. Denoting cCt and cXt the consumption of a repre-
sentative consumption good worker and of a representative investment good worker, we have:
cCt =
(∫ 1
0
c
ε−1
ε
Cjt dj
) ε
ε−1
,
cXt =
(∫ 1
0
c
ε−1
ε
Xjtdj
) ε
ε−1
.
Consumption workers are all identical, infinitely lived and have preferences over consumption
and leisure given by ∑
βt (ln(cct) + Φ(1− `Ct)) ,
with 1 > β > 0 and Φ > 0. For simplicity, investment workers are myopic20, and do not make
intertemporal choices: they do not own any assets nor have any liabilities, and just consume
their current labor income. Their preferences are given by
U
(
cXt −Ψ `
1+γ
Xt
1 + γ
)
,
with γ > 0 and where U is a concave and C2 function.
Each monopoly j produces a variety of consumption good according to the following constant
return to scale technology:
Cjt = ΘtKjt + AtLCt.
Capital and labor are perfectly substitutable in the production of consumption good varieties,
which allows for an easier analytical solution. Θt is a capital specific stochastic technologi-
cal shock and At a labor specific one. The investment good is produced by a representative
competitive firm, with labor only, and according to the constant return to scale technology:
Xt = BLXt.
Capital accumulates according to the following law of motion, with δ ∈ [0, 1]:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt.
In this section, we will assume that there is full depreciation (δ = 1). In appendix (C), we
present the equations for the more general case. As before, there is a monopoly for each variety
20See example 2 of section 3.3 for a justification.
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of the consumption good, while there are competitive markets in labor, investment good, bond
and money. Money remains the nume´raire. Total real output (or real GDP) is measured in
units of consumption and is defined as
Yt = Ct +
Rt
Pt
Xt,
where Pt is the consumption goods price index and Rt is the price of the investment good. We
assume Calvo price setting. In order to embed the standard model of Gal´ı as a special case of
our model when nX = 0, we assume that prices are sticky in the consumption good sector only.
Each consumption firm may reset its price with probability 1−θ, θ ∈ [0, 1]. In the investment
good sector, we maintain the assumption of flexible prices.
Interestingly the log linear approximation for this extended model can be written in a form
very similar to the baseline model, that is, it can be written as
y˜t = −ζ (̂ıt − Etpit+1 − ρ̂ nt ) + Ety˜t+1,
pit = βEtpit+1 + λζ
−1y˜t,
+ Taylor rule,
where λ and ζ are functions of the model parameters. In the baseline New Keynesian model, the
natural rate of output was given by ŷ nt = Ât, and therefore only varied if At varied. However,
in our extended model, the natural or non-inflationary level of output is given by
ŷ nt = φ2At + φ1Et
[
Θ̂t+1 − Ât+1
]
= φ2At + φ1Ω̂t,
where Ω̂t = Et
[
Θ̂t+1 − Ât+1
]
captures a change in expectations that increases the relative
productivity of capital. We can therefore write the Phillips curve alternatively as:
pit = βEtpit+1 + λζ
−1
(
ŷt − φ2At − φ1Ω̂t
)
. (PC)
Now let us consider how this economy reacts to the belief that Θ̂t+1 − Ât+1 will be high as
captured by a high value of Ωt. Such a change in perception will induce consumption workers
to want to by capital as its return is expected to be high, which will lead them to want to
increase their trade with investment workers. It will also induce investment workers to want
to buy more capital, and induce them to buy more consumption goods as they feel richer.
Following the standard nomenclature, this would appear as a type of demand shock. However,
this extended economy does not react to this type of demand shock in the same way that the
baseline model does. As can be seen in equation (PC), an increase in output driven by such
a change in perception will not necessarily place upward pressure on prices as the natural or
non-inflation rate of output has also changed. In (PC) the perception about Ωt itself enters
the Phillips curve, that is, the change in perception makes the output-inflation trade-off better.
Hence a monetary authority who would like to stabilize prices would not want to counteract
such a demand shock, but instead would like to accommodate it.
In such a framework, if an economy found itself in a recession due to a negative change
in perception about the future returns to capital, this would not necessarily place downward
pressure on prices. Similarly, if an economy became widely optimistic about the future returns
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to current investment, this could cause a demand driven boom which could be completely
compatible with stable inflation. Hence, one can see that a model with explicit gains from
trade can behave quite differently, and lead to quite different policy advice, than a model based
on a representative agent framework.
Why is it that the two models give such conflicting views about the effects of demand shock
on inflation? Actually, the two models are not very different in their implications once the
right wording is used. The main lesson from New Keynesian models in terms of inflation is that
inflation is created by output movements which depart from the Walrasian counterpart. This
lesson remains true in our slightly extended model. What is different in our framework is that
perceptions affect the Walrasian equilibrium volumes of trade due to the induced gains from
trade between agents. What one should take away from this example is that distinction between
demand and supply shocks, which has a long history in macroeconomics, is not a very useful
way to organize one’s discussion when agents have incentive to trade between themselves.21
In other words, what should be viewed as causing inflation is deviation of output from the
mutually desirable volume of trade between individuals, knowing that this equilibrium volume
of trade is likely to be as sensitive to current changes in supply capacity as it is of perceptions
about the future.
4.2.3 An interpretation of the recent cycles
Is there any reason to believe that the insight presented above regarding the effects perception
driven fluctuations on inflation are relevant for current economic analysis? We believe so.
Casual evidence to support this claim is given by Figure 2. The Figure displays, for the United
States, Hodrick-Prescott cycles for hours worked and average labor productivity, together with
the level of core inflation and investment-output ratio. If we focus exclusively on the last three
cycles (the last 30 years), we can see how conventional logic has a hard time explaining these
episodes. We can see that the pattern of hours is very similar across the three cycles. The first
well know fact about this period is that this set of boom bust cycles in hours happens with very
little change in inflation (although inflation is still slightly procyclical over the period, it is barely
moving). Using traditional logic, it would appear doubtful that these cycles can be caused by
changes in aggregate demand as inflation would be expected to rise as a natural byproduct
of a demand driven cycle. At the same time, it is interesting to note that labor productivity
and employment have been essentially uncorrelated over the period. This suggests that these
cycles were not driven by cyclically high level of productivity. Finally, we can see from the
investment to output ratio series that cycles are essentially large booms and bust in investment.
The question then arises what has caused these cycles if they are neither driven by neither
technological supply shocks nor demand surprises. One easy interpretation of these cycles is
that they represent cycles driven primarily by the expectation that current investment will
have a high return. The analysis of this paper provides a simple mechanism which can explain
the resulting boom-bust cycle while simultaneously being consistent with stable inflation. For
the same reasons that long and protracted periods of aggregate booms can be non-inflationary,
21 The idea that the demand-supply distinction used in many macroeconomic discussions may not be very
meaningful has been emphasized in many contexts over the years. Our contribution here is to present a simple,
potentially relevant and very transparent example where the distinction is inappropriaten and likely to mislead
policy.
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in our framework recessions are not necessarily creating strong deflationary pressures which is
also a feature of the period.
5 Discussion and evidence
5.1 Discussion of normative issues
In our discussion of policy, we have shown how and under what conditions specialized labor
markets can (i) explain why a monetary authority that accommodates demand driven booms
may not be stimulating inflation, and (ii) explain how government spending in one sector can
spillover positively to other sectors and thereby create increased consumption and generalized
booms. However, these are positive implications. We have not discussed optimal policy. The
first question to focus upon when addressing optimal policy is identify what imperfection is the
policy trying to counter. In our setup, there is one sense in which markets are imperfect and it
is due to the lack of complete markets to insure against changes in perception. The evidence on
consumption presented in the next section will provide support to the notion that agents do not
have access to a sufficient array of contingent claims to protect themselves fully from sectoral
shocks. In such a case government policy may aim to help the economy replicate as best as
possible the type of outcome that would arise with complete markets to share perception risk.
To see what such a policy response may look like, we return to our two agent setup where the
exogenous disturbance is a change in perception about future returns to capital. While these
perceptions could be erroneous, we will treat that here as being shared by the policy makers
and discuss only how best to respond given the perception.22
Let us consider the environment where we have two types of agents i = 1, 2 of mass 1, and
preferences are given by
U i(C1) + ν(1− Li) + V i(Ki,Ω1),
with U i1 > 0, U
i
11 < 0 and V
i
12 > 0. Agent 1 can only produce consumption goods, and agent 2
can only produce investment goods. Production technology is one-to-one in both sectors. The
variable governing perceptions, Ω1, can take on two values, Ω¯ > Ω, where the probability of it
taking on the value Ω¯ is q.
How can fiscal policy be used in such an environment to an support an ex-ante Pareto
optimal outcome? What is needed is that policy be chosen so that marginal utility for each
agent is equalized across states. This can be done quite simply with a tax transfer scheme
between individuals, which satisfies budget balance and it can in addition be chosen to be fair
in the sense of zero expected transfers between the parties.23 In particular, if we denote by
T (Ω¯) the tax imposed on type 2 agents in the optimistic state, then the fair transfer received
in the pessimistic state can be written as 1−q
q
T (Ω¯). Accordingly, in such a case the transfer to
type 1 in the optimistic state is T (Ω¯), and the tax in the pessimistic state is given by 1−q
q
T (Ω¯).
The value for T (Ω¯) that implements a Pareto optimum can be found by solving the Walrasian
22 If the policy makers think the perceptions are erroneous, this would provide a different reason for policy
intervention. While this is an interesting and potentially relevant issue, we do not pursue this issue here.
23 The fair aspect is not a requirement for a Pareto optimum, it is simply a way of selecting one allocation in
the set of Pareto optima.
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Figure 2: U.S. business cycles
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In this Figure, hours worked and average labor productivity are in relative deviations from
an Hodrick-Prescott trend with smoothing parameter λ = 1600. Inflation and investment-
output ratio are unfiltered and expressed in percentage points. Shaded areas represent
NBER recession periods. Data are quarterly, and run from 1956Q1 (1959Q1 for core infla-
tion) to 2010Q3. Core inflation is the growth rate of “Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers: All Items Less Food & Energy” (CPILFESL in FRED). Investment to output
ratio is computed using current price Gross domestic product A191RC1 and Gross private
domestic investment A006RC1, as taken from Table 1.1.5.of the NIPA published by the Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis. Hours worked are taken from BLS (Series Id: PRS85006033)
and concern the nonfarm business sector.
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equilibrium for the two states and imposing the conditions that
U21
(
(p(Ω¯)(L2(Ω¯)−K2(Ω¯))− T (Ω¯)) = U21 ((p(Ω)(L2(Ω)−K2(Ω)) + 1− qq T (Ω)
)
.
Recall that the equilibrium conditions for the case where Ω1 = Ω¯ will be
p(Ω¯)U21
(
p(Ω¯)(L2(Ω¯)−K2(Ω¯))− T (Ω¯)) = ν,
p(Ω¯)U21
(
p(Ω¯)(L2(Ω¯)−K2(Ω¯))− T (Ω¯)) = V 21 (K2(Ω¯), Ω¯),
K1(Ω¯) +K2(Ω¯) = L2(Ω¯),
U11 ((L
1(Ω¯)− p(Ω¯)K1(Ω¯)) + T (Ω¯)) = ν,
p(Ω¯)U11 (L
2(Ω¯)− p(Ω¯)K2(Ω¯)) + T (Ω¯)) = V 21 (K1(Ω¯), Ω¯).
The resulting policy will be one that taxes workers in the capital good sector when agents are
optimistic, and transfers fund to them when agents are pessimistic. These transfers induce
full consumption smoothing for workers in the capital sector and thereby stabilize the price
of capital. It should be noted that such an intervention will tend to increase the volatility of
capital purchases, as well as employment in the capital goods sector, as optimal intervention
does not require stabilizing investment. If fact, taking as given the changing perceptions of
the future return to capital, it is optimal to have investment fluctuate significantly in response
to these changes.24 It is worth noting that unemployment insurance in many countries plays
a role somewhat similar to the optimal policy described here. Unemployment insurance tends
to dis-proportionally transfer income to workers in capital good sectors when the economy is
doing badly. Such transfers are generally based on past wages and therefore will tend to keep
up current wages and the price of capital in recessions. This will likely amplify employment
movements in the capital good sector, but this is precisely what is optimal when consumption
is stabilized.25
5.2 Evidence of labor market segmentation and imperfect insurance
Gains from trade between individuals in the goods markets arise when agents don’t produce
the same goods. If agents can always allocate their time without frictions between different
sectors of production then there would be no explicit gains from trade in these markets. Even
if labor supply is lumpy, as long as agents can move freely between sectors their labor income
should not differ depending on the sector they happened to have chosen at a point in time.
24 If we don’t assume separable or quasi linear preferences, the analysis is not much changed. An ex-ante
Pareto optimum can be obtained by simply setting a tax transfer scheme that keeps the marginal utility of type
2 equal across the two states, that is
U21
(
p(Ω¯)(L2(Ω¯)−K2(Ω¯))− T (Ω¯), 1− L2(Ω¯)) = U21 (p(Ω)(L2(Ω)−K2(Ω)) + 1− qq T (Ω), 1− L2(Ω)).
25 One of the aspects we find interesting about adopting an approach with explicit gains from trade is that
it simultaneously provides insight into why optimism and pessimism may be at the center of business cycle
fluctuations, and also provide a explanation to why many governments try to counter such cycles by use of
transfer programs and other automatic stabilizers.
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In this section we want to briefly examine the extent to which individual-level labor income
varies over the cycle depending on what sector one tends to be associated with at the beginning
of a period.
To look at this issue, we used data from the PSID over the period 1968-2007. The PSID
interviews families during the March-April period26 and asks them questions about their income
over the previous calendar year. They also report, among others, information related to age,
educational attainment and sector of employment. These data were collected yearly between
1968-1997, and then bi-annually since 1999.
We are interested in examining whether the growth in labor income of the head of household
was systematically related to the aggregate performance of the sector (industry) to which the
head was attached at the beginning of the period. More precisely, our dependent variable is the
growth (log-difference) in the labor income of head of household over either a two-year period
or a one-year period. When looking at one year rates, we can use data only from 1969 up to
1997.27 When using two year growth rates, we use non-overlapping periods from 1969-2007.
Our main regressor is the growth rate of either the industry level wage bill or employment
rate associated with the head’s sector of employment at the time of the interview. These
national level variables were taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National
Income and Product Account (NIPA) Tables.28
The other regressors we include in the specification are a full set of year dummies, a full
set of age dummies, a control for the highest level of educational attainment, dummies for the
sector of employment, and interactions between age-time, education-age and education-time.
The coefficients on these later variables are not reported in the table.
In a second set of regressions, we use as the dependent variable the growth rate (log-
difference) in the household’s total food consumption, and relate this, again to the industry-
level growth rates of either the wage bill or the employment rate of the industry the household
head works in at the time of the interview. Total food consumption is constructed as the sum of
expenditures on food at home and food out.29 Food consumption data is missing for 1973, 1988,
1989. There was also a change in the wording of the questions in 1994, so we do not calculate
any growth rates that overlap this period. Our sample is chosen so that we cover the same
years and a similar sample when looking at either the behavior of income or consumption.30
Column 1 of Table 1 reports results associated with regressing the growth over two years
in individual level labor income on the set of individual level controls noted above and on the
growth in national level employment for the sector with which the individual was associated at
the beginning of the period. National level growth in employment is calculated over the same
26 In most cases, although some interviews also occur during other months.
27 We cannot use 1968 because we do not have aggregate data for that year.
28 Specifically, Section 6, Table 6.3: Wage and Salary Accruals by Industry, and Table 6.5: Full-Time Equiv-
alent Employees by Industry. For the correspondence used to match the industry codes in the NIPA Tables
(which are SIC and NAICS) and the ones in the PSID (which are Census Codes), see Table B.1.
29 We also add expenditure on food delivered, when available.
30 This restricts the sample years to those in which 2-year growth rates in food consumption data is available,
so the years included are 1969, 1975-1985, 1991, and 1995-2005. For consistency, when using the growth in labor
income as the dependent variable, we also examine results when using all years available as opposed to using
only the years for which consumption data is available as well. Results are not significantly different. We also
used the trimming criteria that consumption growth could not increase or decrease by more than 100% over a
two year period.
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period as growth in individual level income. Since the specification also includes a set of time
dummies, the estimate of the effect of sectoral level growth in employment on individual level
income is identified off the cross-sectional variation where we are comparing the growth rate
in labor income at a point in time between individuals who happen to be in different sectors
of employment at the time of the interview. If labor markets were completely integrated, and
given we are controlling for common time effects, then individual level outcomes should not be
systematically related to aggregate outcomes for any particular sectors.
In Column 1 individuals are classified into three broad sectors: the government sector, the
capital goods sector defined as manufacturing and construction, and a residual sector which
captures all other sectors including the main product units for current consumption goods.31
The effect of changes in aggregate employment growth on individual level income is estimated
to be close to .5. Recall that an individual is linked to a sector by his beginning of period
classification. This coefficient suggests that when comparing two individuals that were initially
attached to two different sectors, the individual initially attached to the sector where aggregate
employment grew by an extra 1% over two years saw his labor income grow by an additional
.5%. This effect is quite sizable, suggesting that individuals are not sufficiently mobile between
sectors to constantly induce equivalent returns across sectors.
In Column 2 of the table we replace as regressor aggregate employment growth in the sec-
tor by growth in the wage bill in the sector. This change in the indicator for sectoral growth
gives an almost identical result, suggesting that changes in the wage bill are dominated by
changes in employment, not changes in average wages. As we generally found that these two
aggregate indicators gave similar results, we will focus exclusively on the effects of the aggre-
gate employment growth variable in the remaining results. In Column 3, we drop observations
where individuals were linked to the government sector. This again does not change signifi-
cantly the estimate of the effect of sectoral growth on individual income growth. In Column
4, we take a slightly more detailed view of sectors by linking individuals to 10 different sectors
i.e. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; Mining; Construction; Manufacturing; Transportation,
Communication and Public Utilities; Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate; Services; and Government.32 Again, this changes very little the main estimated
coefficient.33 As individuals with different levels of educational attainment had quite distinct
labor market outcomes over the period we cover, in Column 5 we re-estimate the specification
of Column 4 focusing only on individuals with an educational attainment of high school or less.
Results for more highly educated individuals are similar but slightly less precise. Controlling
for education in this alternative way also does not change significantly our results suggesting
that the results are unlikely to be driven simply by some compositional effect across education
groups.
In Columns 6, 7 and 8 of Table 1 we report results based on one year intervals instead of two
year intervals. As the PSID only collected yearly observations until 1997, these results cover
31 Individuals that did not declare an industry because of unemployment status were included in the residual
category.
32 Details of the links used between the PSID classification and the NAICS are detailed in Appendix B.
33 In the specification using 10 sectors we cluster standard errors at the sectoral level. The effect of clustering
has very little effect on the standard errors. In the case of 2 or 3 sectors we did not cluster standard errors
as the number of sectors is too small. When we did try to cluster in such specifications, the standard errors
become very small, which seemed unreasonable.
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only the period up to 1997.34 In Column (6) we report results for the 3 sector specification,
Column 7 corresponds to the 2 sector specification as was the case in Column 3, and finally
Column 8 reports results for the 10 sector specification. Somewhat surprisingly, the results
for the one year specification are very similar in magnitude to those observed in the 2-year
specification, suggesting that the segmentation likely lasts more than a year.
The results from Table 1 provide support to the notion that, at least at frequencies relevant
for business cycle analysis, labor markets across sectors appear segmented. In particular, these
results suggest that the mobility across sectors is not sufficient to equate the returns to labor
between individuals initially attached to different sectors. While such a segmentation of the
labor markets is a necessary condition underlying our results regarding how changes in percep-
tion can cause positive aggregate co-movement, it is also necessary that such sectoral effects
translate themselves at least in part to differences in consumption behavior. For this reason
in Table 2 we examine the link between sectoral outcomes and individual level consumption
behavior. The structure of the results in the Table is almost identical to that of Table 1 except
for the fact that we change the dependent variable. All the regressors and the sample decisions
are the same as in Table 1. The only difference is that now the dependent variable is the change
in the consumption of food for the household as opposed to changes in the labor income of the
head of household.
While consumption of food is a quite narrow measure of consumption, it is the main con-
sumption variable available in the PSID. The estimated effects in Table 2 are considerably
smaller than in Table 1, but are nevertheless significant and sizable. The fact that the coef-
ficients are smaller should not be surprising as it is well established that people smooth their
consumption over time in response to temporary income shocks and further the measure of
income used in Table 1 is likely to be much more volatile than disposable family income due to
taxes and transfer payments such an unemployment insurance. The main result we take from
Table 2 is the observation that family level consumption behavior appears to be significantly
affected by the the performance of the sector with which the head was initially associated.
This suggests that asset and insurance markets, while important in helping smooth income,
are likely insufficient (or not sufficiently used) to entirely protect individuals from temporary
shocks to their sectors of employment.35
34 The years with the required data are 1969-1970, 1972, 1974-1985, 1990-1991, and 1994-1995.
35 Our results on consumption are consistent with the results of Cochrane [1991], Dynarski and Gruber [1997]
and Blundel, Pistaferri, and Preston [2009] which document that individual level food consumption in the PSID
responds to unemployment shocks.
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Table 1: Effect of Sectoral Growth on Individual Income.
2-year 2-year 2-year 2-year 2-year 1-year 1-year 1-year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ Emp .542 .468
(.209) (.244)
∆ W-bill .525
(.175)
∆ Emp-10 .450 .563
(.143) (.131)
∆ Emp .535 .579
(.170) (.193)
∆ Emp-10 .471
(.059)
Obs. 49338 49338 45469 45430 23173 68863 63677 61224
R2 .028 .028 .028 .027 .026 .017 .018 .018
Note: Dependent variable: log change in real income from wages and salaries. The main regressor (∆
Emp) is the log change in employment at the national level for the sector of employment to which the
individual was attached to at the beginning of the period. ∆ W-bill corresponds to the change in the
wage bill per sector. See main text for details on the additional controls included in the regressions
but not reported in the table.
Table 2: Effect of Sectoral Growth on Household Consumption
2-year 2-year 2-year 2-year 2-year 1-year 1-year 1-year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ Emp .268 .267
(.092) (.104)
∆ W-bill .236
(.078)
∆ Emp-10 .143 .112
(.052) (.053)
∆ Emp .200 .274
(.118) (.129)
∆ Emp-10 .208
(.077)
Obs. 67758 67758 63686 52270 26898 89008 83942 65503
R2 .014 .014 .013 .016 .015 .005 .005 .006
Dependent variable: log change in real income from wages and salaries. The main regressor (∆ Emp) is
the log change in employment at the national level for the sector of employment to which the individual
was attached to at the beginning of the period. ∆ W-bill corresponds to the change in the wage bill per
sector. See main text for details on the additional controls included in the regressions but not reported
in the table.
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5.3 Related literature
The aim of this paper has been to illustrate how introducing explicit intra-temporal gains from
trade between individuals can shed light on a set of macroeconomic phenomena. In particular,
we have shown how labor market specialization can help explain (i) perception driven booms
and busts, (ii) government spending having positive effects on private consumption, and (iii)
non-inflationary demand driven expansion and non-deflationary busts. While a strength of the
approach is to offer a simple unified explanation for such behavior, there are alternative models
which can also explain some of these features. The related literature is obviously expansive
and therefore an exhaustive review is not possible here. Nonetheless, it appears relevant to
discuss a few alternatives that aim to address similar issues and clarify some of their different
implications. First, standard sticky price models can explain perception driven booms and
busts if the conduct of monetary policy is stated in a particular form. But when sticky prices
are central to the mechanism, it implies that inflation will also respond to perception changes in
a systematic way, which contrasts with our approach where such fluctuations can arise without
any systematic movement in inflation. At this point it is unclear which view is more empirically
relevant but they are very distinct mechanisms with different implications which eventually
should be possible to evaluate. The sticky price model with a representative agent can also
explain why government expenditures may increase private consumption, but as discussed in
Bilbiie [2011] the mechanism is rather subtle as it only arises when agents preferences are non-
separable between consumption and leisure. In contrast, the mechanism in our model is quite
transparent as government expenditures will cause increases in consumption if the expenditures
create gains from trade between those benefiting from the government expenditures and those
that produce consumption goods.
If we move away from sticky price models, there is also an important literature aimed
at explaining perception driven booms and bust36 within a flexible price setting. A notable
example of this literature is the paper by Jaimovich and Rebelo [2009].37 The mechanism by
which optimism about the future leads to increase in current economic activity in the Jaimovich
and Rebelo environment is very different to the one in the current paper. In particular, the
two key mechanisms in the Jaimovich and Rebelo framework are (i) that optimism about the
future leads to a decrease in the price of investment goods today – because of adjustment costs
to investment– and (ii) that a reduction in the price of capital today leads to increased labor
productivity today and therefore labor demand given the incentives to utilize capital more
intensely. Such a mechanism is rather subtle when compared to our mechanism based on labor
market specialization whereby optimism about future returns to holding capital favors trade
between agents in the consumption sector and those in the investment sector.38 At this point in
36 Here we do not consider the recent literature that uses measures of optimism to examine whether perceptions
may be important in fluctuations (see for example Farmer and Guo [1995], Carrol [2003], Harrison and Weder
[2006] Barsky and Sims [2010] and Leduc and Sill [2010]).
37 Other relevant contributions are Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner [2009], Eusepi and Preston [2009], Beaudry
and Portier [2004], Beaudry and Portier [2007] and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [2008] among others. An important
difference between this literature and the current paper is that this literature does not generally try to offer
a unified explanation to how perception changes and government spending may induce macroeconomic co-
movements.
38 Our approach views perception changes as creating sectoral shocks, in particular creating shocks to the
investment sector relative to the consumption sector. In this dimension our framework shares ideas in the
sectoral shock literature as pioneered by Lilien [1982].
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time, we are unsure which mechanism is more empirically relevant but this also offers relevant
questions for future work.
6 Conclusion
Two of the key questions in macroeconomics are: what causes business cycle fluctuations and
to what extend can or should government mitigate such fluctuations? In this paper we have
shown how a macroeconomic model with explicit gains from trade between individuals may
provide a useful framework to help frame these issue. For example, when thinking whether any
exogenous change will cause an expansion or a recession, the aim of this paper is to suggest that
a meaningful way to pose the question is to ask is whether the impinging force will expand or
decrease the set of mutually desirable trades between individuals working in different sectors of
the economy. In such a framework an expansion is seen as a period when there are substantial
gains from trade between individuals in the different sectors of the economy, while a recession
where the amount of perceived gains from trade is low. Similarly, if thinking about whether a
government policy will reduce or exacerbate fluctuations, one should ask how the intervention
will affect the gains from trade between individuals in the different sectors. Obviously for
such an approach to be relevant, it must be the case that workers are not perfectly mobile
between sectors in the short run. Since such an assumption seems rather plausible, it is not
very surprising that considerable support for it can be found in PSID data.
One of the areas where we believe a gains from trade approach may be most helpful is
with respect to understanding fluctuations driven by changes in perceptions about the future
(whether these be rational or irrational perceptions). In the business press and in the public at
large it is common to think of changes in sentiment as a quintessential cause of macroeconomic
fluctuations. However, most modern macroeconomic models have certain drawbacks, or work
through subtle mechanisms to explain such outcomes. For example in most New Keynesian
models, depending on the monetary policy in place, a perception driven boom should either
cause consumption and investment to move in opposite directions or cause inflation to increase
substantially. Given our experience over the last thirty year with cycles that appear primarily
driven by perceptions of regarding the returns to investment, none of these features are very
compelling. In contrast, once one adopts a framework where labor markets are segmented
across different types of goods, we have shown that it is rather easy to generate perception
driven booms where consumption, investment and the price of capital (as possibly captured by
the stock market) all increase together without directly putting pressure on inflation.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The first part of the proposition is shown to be satisfied by the
example given in the main text. All that remains to be shown is that strong positive co-
movement is not possible. We will show this by contradiction. So let us assume that an increase
in Ω1 leads to an increase in C
i and Li for both agents 1 and 2. When consumption and leisure
are normal, this implies that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
U i2(C
i,1−Li)
U i1(C
i,1−Li) increases for both agents.
39 Without loss of generality, we can assume that agent
1 works in the consumption sector, and hence the condition
U i2(C
i,1−Li)
U i1(C
i,1−Li) = F
C
1 (L
C1, LC2) must
hold and accordingly FC1 (L
C1, LC2) must increase in response to an increase in Ω1. There are
then two cases to consider, either agent 1 is the only agent working in the consumption sector
or both agents are working in the consumption sector. If agent 1 is the only agent, then the
marginal production in this sector is fixed due to CRS and hence we have a contradiction as the
condition
U12 (C
1,1−L1)
U11 (C
1,1−L1) = F
C
1 (L
C1) cannot be satisfied if there is strong positive co-movement.
If both agents work in the consumption sector, then we need
U i2(C
i,1−Li)
U i1(C
i,1−Li) = F
C
i (L
C1, LC2) to
hold for both agents, which implies that the marginal product must increase for each type of
agent, that FCi (L
C1, LC2) must increase for i equal 1 and 2. But with the production function
satisfying concavity and CRS, this is not possible.40
Proof of Proposition 2: There are two components to this proposition. First we need
to show that with homogeneous labor, it is impossible to get positive co-movement. If labor
is homogeneous, then F c1 (L
C1 + LC2) = PFK1 (L
K1 + LK2). Since we are assuming that the
production function satisfies constant returns to scale, this implies that the marginal products
are constant. It therefore directly follows that
U i2(C
i,1−Li)
U i1(C
i,1−Li) must remain constant for each worker.
Under the assumption that consumption and leisure are normal goods, this implies that Ci and
Li must move in opposite directions (or remain unchanged) in response to a change Ω1 and
hence positive co-movement is impossible. The second part of the proposition can be shown by
example. In particular, Example 1 in section 3.3 is a case with identical preferences in which
changes in Ω1 cause individual positive co-movement and positive price-quantity co-movement.
Proof of Proposition 3: This proposition uses the demand functions Ki(P,wi,Ω1) and the
supply functions Li(P,wi,Ω1) to characterize the equilibrium. There are three equilibrium
prices– P,w1 and w2– that will adjust to equate demand and supply in the two labor markets
and in the market for capital (the market for consumption goods will be cleared by Walras’
Law). Given that agents are specialized, the type 1 worker can produce only the consumption
good, and that the production function is one-to-one, then equilibrium in the type 1 labor
market implies w1 = 1. Similarly, given that type 2 can only produce the investment good,
39 d
Ui2(C
i,1−Li)
Ui1(C
i,1−Li) = [U1U21 − U2U11]dC + [U2U12 − U1U22]dL. The two terms in brackets are precisely the
conditions defining normal goods, hence dC and dL positive implies an increase in U2U1 .
40 For both marginal products to increase we need FC11dL
C1 + FC12dL
C2 > 0 and FC12dL
C1 + FC22dL
C2 > 0.
CRS implies that FC12 = −FC11 L
C1
LC2
and FC12 = −FC22 L
C2
LC1
. This implies that we need LC1 F
C
11[
dLC1
LC1
− dLC2
LC2
] > 0
LC2FC22[
dLC2
LC2
− dLC1
LC1
] > 0 which is impossible.
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equilibrium in the type 2 labor market implies that w2 = P . The equilibrium determination of
p is therefore determined by the condition
K1(P, 1; Ω1) +K
2(P, P ; Ω1) = L
2(P, P ; Ω1).
Hence the effect of Ω1 on P is given by
dP
dθ
=
L23 −K23 −K13
K21 +K
2
2 +K
1
1 − L21 − L22
. (A.1)
To sign this effect, we need to look at properties of the demand functions. These will depend
on on four terms Λ, χ,Γ,∆ which are defined as follows (where subscripts represent derivative)
Λ ≡ U22U11 − U212, (A.2)
χ = w2U11 − 2wU12 + U22,
where concavity implies that Λ is positive and χ is negative. Furthermore, since C and (1− L)
are normal goods, this implies that:
Γ ≡ wU11 − U12 < 0, (A.3)
∆ ≡ wU12 − U22 > 0. (A.4)
Given these definition, the derivative of the demand functions are given as follows
L1 =
Γ (V11K + V1)
p2Λ + χV11
R 0, (A.5)
K1 =
χU1 − pKΛ
p2Λ + χV11
< 0, (A.6)
L2 = −ΓlV11 + U1 (p
2U11 + V11)
p2Λ + χV11
R 0, (A.7)
K2 =
p (lΛ− ΓU1)
p2Λ + χV11
> 0, (A.8)
L3 = − pΓV12
p2Λ + χV11
> 0, (A.9)
K3 = − χV12
p2Λ + χV11
> 0. (A.10)
Therefore we have
L23 −K22 =
(χ− PΓ)V12
P 2Λ + χV11
,
=
−∆V12
P 2Λ + χV11
< 0,
so the numerator on the RHS of (A.1) is negative. The assumptions in the Proposition assure
that the denominator is negative. Hence under the conditions of the proposition we have
dP
dΩ1
> 0.
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To examine the effects of an increase in Ω1 on consumption, investment and employment we
now need to examine if L1 and L2 increase with Ω1 , taking into account its effect on equilibrium
prices. Hence for positive co-movement we need
L11
dP
dΩ1
+ L13 > 0, (L
2
1 + L
2
2)
dP
dΩ1
+ L23 > 0.
Since Li3 > 0, then by the assumptions of the proposition we have that an increase in Ω1 leads
to positive co-movement.
Proof of Proposition 4: With ex-ante trading in claims dependent on Ω1, the agent’s first
order conditions are of the form
ΠmU
i
1(C
i
m, 1− Lim) = λipcm,
ΠmU
i
2(C
i
m, 1− Lim) = λiwim,
ΠmV
i
1 (K
i
m,Ω1) = λ
ipkm,
where λi is the multiplier related to agent i’s budget set. If labor is homogeneous, then pcm = w
i
m
for i = 1, 2, and therefore
U i1(C
i
m, 1− Lim)
U i2(C
i
m, 1− Lim)
= 1.
Hence, because goods are normal, consumption and labor have to move in opposite directions
and therefore positive co-movement induced by realizations of Ω1 is not possible.
If agents are specialized, then for the agent in the consumption good sector, it will again
be the case that
U i1(C
i
m,1−Lim)
U i2(C
i
m,1−Lim) = 1 and hence his consumption cannot increase if his employment
increases. Further, we have the risk sharing condition that implies that the marginal utility
of consumption must move in the same direction for both types of agents. Under separable
preferences, this implies that consumption of both types must move in tandem. Given that the
consumption of the type working in the consumption sector can increase with an increase in
his labor, this implies that aggregate consumption does not move with a change in Ω1 hence
positive co-movement is not possible.
Proof of Proposition 5: When labor is homogeneous, an increase in government purchases
of investment goods will not change marginal products. Hence, normality implies that Ci and
Li must move in opposite directions and therefore positive co-movement is not possible as
employment will need to decrease for at least one type of labor if consumption is to increase.
Proof of Proposition 6: For this proposition, we will work with the demand functions
Ki(p, wi,Ω1, T
i) and the labor supply function Li(p, wi,Ω1, T
i) where these functions are defined
as the solution to
max
Ci,Ki,Li
U i(Ci, 1− Li) + V i(Ki,Ω1)
subject to
Ci + PKi = wiLi − T i.
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Under the maintained assumptions on utility, these functions continue to have the properties
spelled out in the proof of Proposition 3. In addition, it is easy to verify that Li4 > 0, K
i
4 > 0,
0 > pKi4 > 1 and 1 > (L
2
4 − K24) > 0. Therefore, to verify the proposition all we need is to
check that dP
dG
> 0, where P solves the capital market equilibrium condition given by
K1(P, 1,Ω1, T
1) +K2(P, P,Ω1, T
2) +G = L2(P, P,Ω1, T
2).
When T 1 = αPG and T 2 = (1− α)PG, we have
dP
dθ
=
L24(1− α)P − 1−K24(1− α)P −K14αP
K21 +K
2
2 +K
2
4(1− α)P +K11 +K14αP − L21 − L22 − L24(1− α)P
. (A.11)
The properties of the demand functions imply that numerator of this expression is negative,
and the assumptions of the proposition ( K21 + K
2
2 + K
1
1 < 0, L
2
1 ≥ 0 and L22 ≥ 0) again
combined with the properties of the demand functions imply that the denominator is negative,
hence dP
dG
> 0.
To examine whether an increase in G (on investment) leads to an increase in total investment
we need to examine the sign of(
L21 + L
2
2 + L
2
4(1− α)G
) dP
dG
+ L24(1− α)P.
The assumptions of the proposition (regarding labor supply) and the properties of the labor
supply function imply that this term is positive.
To examine whether an increase in G (on investment) does not lead to an increase in private
investment we need to examine the sign of
(K11 +K
1
4αG+K
2
1 +K
2
2 +K
2
4(1− α)G)
dP
dG
+K14αP +K
1
2(1− α)P.
The assumptions of the proposition (regarding capital demand) and the properties of the labor
supply function imply that this term is negative.
Finally to examine whether the fiscal policy leads to an increase in the production of con-
sumption good we need to examine the sign of
(L11 + L
1
4αG)
dP
dG
+ L14αP.
The assumptions of the proposition (regarding labor supply) and the properties of the labor
supply function imply that this term is positive. Hence, an increase in Government expen-
ditures on investment goods causes positive co-movement, with a positive spillover effect on
consumption but a negative effect on private investment (no amplification).
B Data
In Table B.1, we present the correspondence we used to match industries between NIPA and
PSID.
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Table B.1: Correspondence between Industries in NIPA tables and Industry Codes in the PSID
SIC-72 & SIC-87 NAICS 1970 COC 2000 COC
Industry Line Number Line Number (1 or 2 dig) (3 dig)
(NIPA Tables) (NIPA Tables) (PSID) (PSID)
Ag., Forest, Fish 4 4 1 017-029
Mining 7 7 2 037-049
Construction 12 12 3 077
Manufacturing 13 13 4 107-399
Transp., Comm. Publ U. 37 11, 43 5 607-639, 647-679
52 5 607-639, 647-679
Wholesale Trade 50 35 62 407-459
Retail Trade 51 38 61 467-579
Fin., Ins., R. Estate 52 57, 62 7 687-719
Services 60 65, 69, 70, 8-11 727-929
82, 85
82, 85
Government 76 86 12 937-959
C Analytical steps of A New Keynesian model with ex-
plicit gains from trade (not for publication)
Let us consider a simple New Keynesian model that we augment to include explicit gains from
trade between individuals. Some agents will produce the consumption good and some the
investment good. Although we allow for capital accumulation and agents heterogeneity, we will
make functional forms assumptions to preserve tractability of the model. The model will have
the basic New Keynesian model of Gal´ı [2008] as a special case.
C.1 Fundamentals
C.1.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by nC consumption good workers and nX investment good work-
ers. All agents consume an aggregate consumption good, that is a basket of monopolistically
produced consumption goods indexed by j. Denoting cCt and cXt the consumption of a repre-
sentative consumption good worker and of a representative investment good worker, we have:
cCt =
(∫ 1
0
c
ε−1
ε
Cjt dj
) ε
ε−1
,
cXt =
(∫ 1
0
c
ε−1
ε
Xjtdj
) ε
ε−1
.
with ε > 1. Consumption workers are all identical, infinitely lived and have preferences over
consumption and leisure given by∑
βt (ln(cct) + Φ(1− `Ct)) .
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with 1 > β > 0 and Φ > 0. For simplicity, investment workers are myopic, and do not make
intertemporal choices: they do not own any assets nor have any liabilities, and just consume
their current labor income. Their preferences are given by
U
(
cXt −Ψ `
1+γ
Xt
1 + γ
)
,
with γ > 0 and where U is a concave and C2 function.
C.1.2 Technologies
Each monopoly j produces a variety of consumption good according to the following constant
return to scale technology:
Cjt = ΘtKjt + AtLCt.
Capital and labor are perfectly substitutable in the production of consumption good varieties,
which allow for an easier analytical solution. Θt is a capital specific stochastic technological
shocks and At a labor specific one.
41 For simplicity, these are the only source of uncertainty in
the model.
The investment good is produced by a representative competitive firm, with labor only, and
according to the constant return to scale technology:
Xt = BLXt.
Capital accumulates according to the following law of motion, with δ ∈ [0, 1]:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt.
C.1.3 Markets organization
There is a monopoly for each variety of the consumption good. Labor, investment good, bonds
and money markets are competitive. Money is the nume´raire. Total real output (or real GDP)
is measured in units of consumption and is defined as
Yt = Ct +
Rt
Pt
Xt,
where Pt is the consumption goods price index and Rt is the price of the investment good.
C.1.4 Price setting
When prices are sticky, we assume Calvo price setting. In order to embed the standard model
of Gal´ı as a special case of our model when nX = 0, we assume that prices are sticky in the
consumption good sector only. Each consumption firm may reset its price with probability
1− θ, θ ∈ [0, 1]. In the investment good sector, we maintain the assumption of flexible prices.
41 One can allow for a correlation between Θ and A, to account for total factor productivity shocks.
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C.1.5 Monetary authorities
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule.
C.2 Households
C.2.1 Consumption worker
The representative consumption worker maximizes expected utilityE0 [
∑∞
t=0 β
t (ln cCt + Φ(1− `Ct))]
subject to the budget constraint:
PtcCt +Rtkt+1 +Qtbt ≤ ((1− δ)Rt + Zt)kt +WCt`Ct + tCt +Bt−1,
with
PtcCt =
∫ 1
0
PjtcCjtdj,
cCt =
(∫ 1
0
c
ε−1
ε
Cjt dj
) ε
ε−1
,
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εjt dj
) 1
1−ε
,
where Zt is the rental rate of capital, WCt is the wage in the consumption good sector and tCt
collects lump sum transfers (including monopolies profits).
First order conditions to this problem are
cCjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ε
cCt,
cCt = Φ
−1WCt
Pt
,
Qt = βEt
[
cCt
cCt+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
,
Rt = βEt
[
cCt
cCt+1
Pt
Pt+1
((1− δ)Rt+1 + Zt+1)
]
.
C.2.2 Investment worker
The representative investment worker maximizes utility U
(
cXt −Ψ `
1+γ
Xt
1+γ
)
subject to the budget
constraint:
PtcXt ≤ WXt`Xt
with
PtcXt =
∫ 1
0
PjtCXjtdj,
cXt =
(∫ 1
0
c
ε−1
ε
Xjtdj
) ε
ε−1
.
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and the first order condition are
cXjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ε
cXt,
Ψ`γXt =
WXt
Pt
.
C.3 Firms
C.3.1 Investment good firms
Firms are competitive, and maximize profits RtXt −WItLIt subject to the technological con-
straint Xt = BLIt. The first order condition is:
WXt = BRt.
C.3.2 Consumption good firms
When prices are flexible (θ = 0), firm j (that produces variety j) maximizes profit PjtCjt −
ZtKjt −WCtLCt subject to technological constraint Cjt = ΘtKjt + AtLCjt and demand cXjt =(
Pjt
Pt
)−ε
cXt. First order conditions are:
Pjt = MZt
Θt
,
Pjt = MWCt
At
,
with M = ε
ε−1 .
When prices are sticky (θ > 0), the firm maximizes expected discounted sum of profits (see
Gal´ı [2008], chapter 3 for details), and optimal pricing behavior is given by
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Qt,t+kCt,t+k (P
?
t −MNt+k,t)
]
= 0, (C.1)
where Qt,t+k = β
k(cCt+k/cCt)(Pt/Pt+k) is the nominal stochastic discount factor, Ct,t+k is the
production of a firm that last reset its price in period t and Nt+k,t is the nominal marginal cost
for a firm that last reset its price in period t.
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C.4 Flexible price equilibrium (θ = 0)
C.4.1 Solution
When prices are flexible, the intertemporal equilibrum is given the following set of equations
CCt = nCΦ
−1WCt
Pt
, (C.2)
Rt = βEt
[
CCt
CCt+1
Pt
Pt+1
((1− δ)Rt+1 + Zt+1)
]
, (C.3)
Qt = βEt
[
CCt
CCt+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
, (C.4)
Ct = CCt + CXt, (C.5)
Ct = ΘtKt + AtLCt, (C.6)
Ψn−γX L
γ
Xt =
WXt
Pt
, (C.7)
CXt =
WXt
Pt
LXt, (C.8)
WXt = BRt, (C.9)
Xt = BLKt, (C.10)
PtΘt = MZt, (C.11)
PtAt = MWCt, (C.12)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt, (C.13)
Yt = Ct +
Rt
Pt
Xt, (C.14)
with CCt = nCcCt, CXt = nXcXt, LCt = nC`Ct, LXt = nX`Xt, Kt = nCkCt and TCt = nCtCt.
From (C.2) and (C.12), on obtains
CCt = nC(MΦ)−1At. (C.15)
Note that only At (and not Θt) enters in the consumption worker’s consumption, which will
happen to be very convenient for tractability when comparing with the sticky prices allocations.
This is of course not a general result. Using (C.11), (C.3) becomes
Rt
Pt
= βEt
[(
Cct
Cct+1
)(
(1− δ)Rt+1
Pt+1
+M−1Θt+1
)]
. (C.16)
The real price (in units of the consumption good) of one unit of investment equals its next period
discounted marginal productivity and resale price net of depreciation. Using the expression of
Cct obtained in (C.15), we get
Rt
AtPt
= βEt
[
(1− δ) Rt+1
At+1Pt+1
+M−1
(
Θt+1
At+1
)]
.
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Solving forward, we obtain the solution for the price of investment:
Rt
Pt
= AtM−1
∞∑
j=1
βj(1− δ)j−1Et
[
Θt+j
At+j
]
. (C.17)
Once the real price of investment is obtained, the rest of the model can be recursively solved
as all the other variables are statically related to the real price of investment.
C.4.2 Log-linear approximation
It is useful to write the model solution when a log-linear approximation around the non stochas-
tic steady state is taken. Using a hat for log deviations from the steady state and with the
notation z = Z/P and r = R/P , equation (C.3) becomes
(r̂t − ĉCt) = β(1− δ)Et [r̂t+1 − ĉct+1] + (1− β(1− δ))Et [ẑt+1 − ĉct+1] . (C.18)
(C.2) and (C.12) give ĉCt = Ât and (C.11) gives ẑt = Θ̂t . Substituting in (C.18) and solving
forward, we obtain
r̂t = Ât + ((1− β(1− δ))
∞∑
j=0
(β(1− δ))jEt
[
Θ̂t+i+1 − Ât+i+1
]
. (C.19)
Denoting by χ = CC
C
the steady state share of the consumption worker’s consumption in total
consumption and by sc =
C
Y
the share of consumption in GDP, we have the following expressions
for aggregate consumption and real GDP:
ĉt = χĉCt + (1− χ)ĉXt, (C.20)
ŷt = scĉt + (1− sc)(r̂t + x̂t). (C.21)
Using (C.8), (C.9) and (C.10), we obtain an expression of Xt as a function of
Rt
pt
. Note that
trade between the two type of agents is made apparent by observing that the budget constraint
of the investment worker is
CXt =
Rt
Pt
Xt. (C.22)
Using (C.20), (C.21) and (C.22), we obtain
ŷt = scχĉCt + (1− scχ)
(
1 + γ
γ
)
r̂t. (C.23)
Putting all this together and log-linearizing, the flexible price allocations are given by (where
a n supperscript represents natural as meaning the “flexible price allocations”)
γŷ nt = βγ(1− δ)Etŷ nt+1 + (1− scχ)(1 + γ)(1− β(1− δ))Et
[
Θ̂t+1 − Ât+1
]
,
−β(1− δ)(γ + 1− scχ)EtÂt+1,
ρ̂ nt = ı̂t − Etpit+1 = EtÂt+1 − Ât,
+ Taylor rule,
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where it = − logQt is the nominal interest rate and ρt the real interest rate..
Note that solving forward, we can write natural output as
ŷ nt =
∞∑
j=0
φ1(j)Et
[
Θ̂t+1+j − Ât+1+j
]
+
∞∑
j=0
φ2(j)Et
[
At+j − β(1− δ)Ât+1+j
]
, (C.24)
with φ1(j) = (1− scχ)
(
1+γ
γ
)
(1−β(1− δ))(β(1− δ))j and φ2(j) =
(
1+γ−scχ
γ
)
(β(1− δ))j. Note
that we have, ∀ j ≥ 0, ∂ŷ nt
∂Ât
> 0,
∂ŷ nt
∂Ât+1
< 0,
∂ŷ nt
∂Θ̂t+1
= 0 and
∂ŷ nt
∂Θ̂t+1
> 0.
C.5 Sticky price equilibrium (θ > 0)
C.5.1 Solution
With Calvo pricing, (consumption price) inflation Πt =
Pt
Pt−1
will evolve according to
Π1−εt = θ + (1− θ)
(
P ?t
Pt−1
)
,
where P ?t is the optimal price set by a firm reoptimizing in period t.
The intertemporal equilibrum is given the following set of equations
CCt = nCΦ
−1WCt
Pt
, (C.25)
Rt = βEt
[
CCt
CCt+1
Pt
Pt+1
((1− δ)Rt+1 + Zt+1)
]
, (C.26)
Qt = βEt
[
CCt
CCt+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
, (C.27)
Ct = CCt + CXt, (C.28)
Ct = ΘtKt + AtLCt, (C.29)
Ψn−γX L
γ
Xt =
WXt
Pt
, (C.30)
CXt =
WXt
Pt
LXt, (C.31)
WXt = BRt, (C.32)
Xt = BLKt, (C.33)
PtΘt = MtZt, (C.34)
PtAt = MtWCt, (C.35)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt, (C.36)
Yt = Ct +
Rt
Pt
Xt, (C.37)
Π1−εt = θ + (1− θ)
(
P ?t
Pt−1
)
, (C.38)
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Qt,t+kCt,t+k (P
?
t −MNt+k,t)
]
= 0. (C.39)
47
Note that the markupMt which is constant when prices are fully flexible is now time varying.
C.5.2 Optimal pricing
Solving for a log-linear version of (C.1), and using the fact that there are constant returns in
the production of the consumption goods, one obtains
pit = βEtpit+1 + λm̂ct, (C.40)
with λ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
, where m̂c is the real marginal cost log deviation from steady state in the
consumption good sector and pit the log deviation of inflation Pt/Pt−1. Note that inflation here
CPI inflation. The average real marginal cost is given by
m̂ct = ŵCt − p̂t.
Using (C.25) and (C.35), we get
m̂ct = ĉCt − Ât,
so that (C.40) becomes
pit = βEtpit+1 + λ
(
ĉCt − Ât
)
. (C.41)
C.5.3 Log-linear approximation
Equations (C.25), (C.34) and (C.35) gives ẑt = Θ̂t−M̂t and ĉct+1 = Ât−M̂t, so that ẑt− ĉCt =
Θ̂t − Ât. Note that ẑt − ĉCt takes the same value in both the flexible and sticky price cases.
Therefore, using (C.18) and using the n subscript for the flexible price allocations (n for natural),
we obtain
r̂t − r̂ nt = ĉCt − Ât. (C.42)
Let us define the output gap y˜t = ŷt− ŷnt . Using (C.23) (that holds both in the flexible and
sticky prices cases), we obtain
y˜t = ζ
(
ĉCt − Ât
)
, (C.43)
with ζ = 1−scχ+γ
γ
. From this equation, we obtain an expression for
(
ĉCt − Ât
)
that we substitute
in (C.41) to obtain a typical New Keynesian Phillips curve:
pit = βEtpit+1 + λζ
−1y˜t. (C.44)
Furthermore, the log-linear approximation of equation (C.26) gives
ĉCt = EtĉCt+1 − (̂ıt − Etpit+1). (C.45)
Using again equation (C.43), we obtain the dynamic IS equation
y˜t = −ζ (̂ıt − Etpit+1 − ρ̂ nt ) + Ety˜t+1. (C.46)
To summarize, allocations of the sticky price model are the given by
y˜t = −ζ (̂ıt − Etpit+1 − ρ̂ nt ) + Ety˜t+1,
pit = βEtpit+1 + λζ
−1y˜t,
+ Taylor rule.
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Using (C.24), the Phillips curve can be written as
pit = βEtpit+1+λζ
−1
(
y˜t −
∞∑
j=0
φ1(j)Et
[
Θ̂t+1+j − Ât+1+j
]
−
∞∑
j=0
φ2(j)Et
[
Ât+j − β(1− δ)Ât+1+j
])
.
(C.47)
Note that when one assumes full depreciation (δ = 1), one has φ1(0) = (1 − scχ)
(
1+γ
γ
)
,
φ2(0) =
(
1+γ−scχ
γ
)
and φ1(j) = φ2(j) = 0 for j ≥ 1. Therefore, natural output is given by
ŷ nt = φ2(0)At + φ1(0)Et
[
Θ̂t+1 − Ât+1
]
,
and the Phillips curve becomes
pit = βEtpit+1 + λζ
−1
(
y˜t − φ2(0)At − φ2(0)Et
[
Θ̂t+1 − Ât+1
])
. (C.48)
C.6 Obtaining the basic New Keynesian model
If we assume that there are no investment workers (nX=0), then no investment is produced
(Xt = 0) and no capital is used in the production of consumption varieties. Therefore, we
are back to the standard model with ŷt = ĉt = ĉCt. In the flexible price allocations, labor
is constant, so that natural output is given by ŷ nt = Ât and the natural real interest rate
ρ̂ nt = EtÂt+1 − Ât.
The model solution is then given by the standard three equations:
y˜t = Ety˜t+1 − (̂ıt − Etpit+1 − ρ̂ nt ) ,
pit = βEtpit+1 + λŷt,
+ Taylor rule.
49
